

THE THIRTEENTH ORATION OF DIO CHRYSOSTOM: COMPLEXITY AND SIMPLICITY, RHETORIC AND MORALISM, LITERATURE AND LIFE*

Abstract: This paper takes the Thirteenth Oration as a test case of many of the questions raised by the career and works of Dio Chrysostom. The speech's generic creativity and philosophical expertise are demonstrated. Historical problems are clarified. Analysis shows how Dio weaves seemingly diverse themes into a complex unity. New answers are given to two crucial interpretative problems. Exploration of Dio's self-representation and of his handling of internal and external audiences and of temporal and spatial relationships leads to the conclusion that he has a serious philosophical purpose: the advocacy of Antisthenic/Cynic *paideia* in place of the current *paideia* both of Romans and Athenians. Paradoxically, this clever, ironic and sophisticated speech deconstructs its own apparent values in the interests of simple, practical moralizing.

FROM his own day on, Dio of Prusa has always been a controversial figure: variously characterized as sophist, philosopher (whether Cynic, Stoic, Platonist or general Socratic), sophistic philosopher, philosophical and political turn-coat, earnest moralist, relentless self-advertiser, friend and critic of Rome, counsellor of emperors, middling local politician, literary and philosophical bantam, of the same stature, among philosophers, as Plutarch or Epictetus, or, among literary figures, as Lucian and the novelists. All these questions converge in *Or.* 13: in von Arnim's judgement, 'one of the most beautiful of Dio's pieces',¹ but also one of his most demanding.

STRUCTURE

The structure of the speech can be variously analysed.

There is a simple bipartite division between the Greek world (1-28) and the Roman (29-37).

From a more detailed thematic perspective, the structure is tripartite. The first part (1-13) relates the decree of exile passed against Dio, his fluctuating responses, consultation of Delphi, embarkation on his wanderings and beginning to be regarded as a philosopher. The second (14-28) summarizes the philosophical teaching that he then dispensed: his virtual and admitted quotation of Socrates' teachings. The third (29-37) summarizes the philosophical teachings, again avowedly Socratic, that he gave in Rome.

But if one analyses how the speech achieves its enormous progression from Dio's account of his exile to a philosophical programme for the salvation of Rome, a quadripartite structure emerges: (1) exile raises the problem of Dio's own moral response and triggers his wanderings (1-11); (2) on these wanderings, people ask Dio about good and evil and the duties of man (12); (3) in reply, he imitates Socrates, who discoursed about money, education, the city, the necessary connection of private and public, concord, the need for a good teacher, and the valuelessness of imperialism (13-28); (4) in Rome, he applies these Socratic categories to the case of corrupt contemporary Rome (29-37).

None of these analyses, however, adequately conveys the depth and detail of the speech's organic unity, which will gradually become clear.

There is one structural problem. The speech ends (37; Dio is summarizing what he said to the Romans): 'I did not, however, say that it was difficult for them to be educated, "since" (I

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Mike Trapp for commenting on other versions; and *JHS*'s referees for stringent critiques. Surviving errors, and translations, are all my own work. The text is Cohoon (1939), cross-referenced with Verrengia (2000).

¹ Von Arnim (1898) 334.

maintained) “when you were better than nobody in the past, you learned easily all the other things that you wished: I speak of horsemanship, bowmanship and hoplite warfare”.’ The original ending must be lost,² but analysis will show that the speech is substantially complete.

One problem with the progression of the argument must be deferred.³

CONTEXT AND DATE

That the place of delivery was Athens, focus of a third of the speech (14-28), cannot immediately be proved (the ancient title *In Athens Concerning Exile* may only be an inference), yet will seem persuasive. The speech was made after Dio was exiled (1). Most scholars date the speech after the *end* of the exile (AD 96), partly because the great majority of Dio’s extant works are post-exilic and partly because of Dio’s description in section 1:

when it came to me to be exiled on account of a stated [λεγόμενης] friendship with a man who was not base [ἀνδρὸς οὐ πονηροῦ],⁴ but who was very close to those who were then fortunate and ruling [τῶν ... τότε εὐδαιμόνων τε καὶ ἀρχόντων] but who was put to death because of those things because of which he seemed blessed to many and indeed to practically everyone – because of his relationship and kinship with those people, this accusation [αἰτίας] having been brought against me, that indeed [δῆ] I was the man’s friend and counsellor, for this is the custom of tyrants, just as it is among the Scythians to bury cupbearers and cooks and concubines with their kings, so to those who are being put to death by them to add others for no reason [αἰτίας].

These scholars take ‘those who were then fortunate and ruling’ as an allusion to a now defunct Flavian dynasty,⁵ and they believe in the Flavian contacts that Dio himself claimed.⁶

But in an influential attack upon that belief,⁷ Sidebottom takes ‘ruling’ as referring merely to ‘leading Romans’, as sometimes elsewhere in Dio.⁸ This seems impossible. The phrase should refer to a general category: close kinship to ‘the then dynasty’ makes sense (such kinship did undo some); close kinship to ‘the then leading Romans’ does not. The man’s very high rank is further supported by his ‘seeming blessed to many and indeed to practically everyone’, by his being compared to ‘kings’ and by the clear allusions to Herodotus 1.5.3-4, 6.1, and 30.2-33 (the mutability of εὐδαιμονία, Croesus the ‘tyrant’, the deceptiveness of worldly εὐδαιμονία and ‘calling no man happy until he is dead’). As in Herodotus, ‘the then fortunate’ were ‘fortunate’ only in their self-estimation and that of the world, and the reality comes in 24, where Dio’s transparent allegory⁹ makes Domitian a δαίμων and his subjects κακοδαίμονες, and in 31, where Dio tells the Romans they need a good education ‘if they are going to be fortunate (εὐδαίμονες) in actuality and in truth, and not, as now, in the opinion of the many’. In 33, the full phrase εὐδαίμονες καὶ ἄρχοντες is applied to the Romans in general, of the ‘self-rule’ necessary for

² Reiske (1798); von Arnim (1893) xxxivff.; Cohoon (1939) 120-1; Desideri (1978) 254; Highet (1983) 80; Verrengia (2000) 169.

³ P. 124.

⁴ Generally taken morally; Whitmarsh (2001) 160 and Moles (2003a) 190 prefer the socio-political ‘of no mean station’. The latter is guaranteed by the contrast between πονηροῦ and εὐδαιμόνων τε καὶ ἀρχόντων, the former is at least retrospectively implicit: ‘not base’ essays both.

⁵ Emperius (1847) 103-8; von Arnim (1898) 230; Desideri (1978) 189; Jones (1978) 138; Verrengia (2000) 74.

⁶ 7.66: ‘[before the exile] I knew the homes and tables ... of satraps and kings’; development in Momigliano (1951) 152 = (1975) 972; (1969) 258-60; Jones (1973) 307-8; (1978) 14-17, 44-5, 123; Desideri (1978) 138-9; Moles (1978) 84-5, 93; (1990) 333; (2003a) 189-91.

⁷ Sidebottom (1996), himself influenced by Rawson (1989), followed by Claassen (1999) 271 n.115, 291 n.33; Salmeri (2000) 61 n.33; Whitmarsh (2001) 156.

⁸ Sidebottom (1996) 451 and nn.35-6, *cf.* Dio 1.44, 13.33 (not the same usage, though thematically related to 13.1: discussion in the text), 39.4, 79.1 and Mason (1974) 110-15; *cf.* Cohoon (1939) 90: ‘high officials’.

⁹ See n.115 below.

genuine good fortune and secure rule over others. In this hierarchy of fortune and ruling, the εὐδαίμονες καὶ ἄρχοντες of 1 should be at the top of the pile, and – as in Herodotus – correspond to the ‘tyrants’. Moreover, as we shall see, complimentary allusions to Nerva and Trajan at the end of the speech create an implicit contrast between the bad rule of Domitian and the good rule of the former, a contrast that suits the speech’s general movement.¹⁰ Hence 1 alludes to ‘régime change’. Reconstruction of Dio’s movements in the Trajanic period then makes 101 the likely delivery date.¹¹

GENERIC AFFILIATIONS

Following the ancient title, scholars have taken *Or.* 13 as a Περὶ φυγῆς, and appreciation of Dio’s handling of exilic *topoi* has grown steadily. Whereas Häslér and Doblehofer detect only one *topos*,¹² Verrengia sees that Dio covers some *topoi* by implication,¹³ and Claassen that, in the opening, consolatory section, Dio refashions the usual writer/addressee relationship into an internal dialectic, with Dio himself both questioner and questioned.¹⁴ Whitmarsh notes numerous *reversals* of *topoi*: creation of conversational immediacy through the omission of a formal prologue (1), failure to attribute the exile to philosophical παρρησία (1), apparently ‘accidental’ becoming a philosopher (3; 11-12), and the simplicity of the means by which Dio ‘discovers’ philosophical truths (2; 3; 7).¹⁵

More could be said. Exilic cosmopolitanism is reflected in Dio’s claim that competent philosophical teachers can be Greeks, Romans, Scythians or Indians (32). Exilic rejection of Athenian civic ideology¹⁶ is additionally pointed when Athenians are both internal and external audiences. Whereas exile characteristically entails physical separation and philosophical alienation from ‘the city’, Dio the dramatic character ends up in Rome (29ff.) and Dio the speaker speaks in Athens. While Dio preserves the traditional cosmopolitan sentiment (32), he ‘homes in’ on Rome as the central place of the earth (36). These last examples illustrate the challenging-ness of Dio’s response to the exile genre: the logic of the speech progressively moves away from it and finally ‘rejects’ it, the focus becoming ever more civic.

For numerous other genres also signify. Philosophical autobiography¹⁷ and protreptic (16, 28) are obvious. There are also affinities with a Πολιτεία¹⁸ and with a Περὶ παιδείας. Debate or dialectic between old and new types of παιδεία is a theme of non-philosophical works such as Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (to which Dio alludes).¹⁹ The speech also has features from epic²⁰ and tragedy,²¹ with Dio ‘hero’ of both.²² Herodotean and Thucydidean allusions²³ import a historiographical quality, as of a narrative formally ‘true’, imbued with high seriousness and moral

¹⁰ P. 125; this contrast is also structural in the *Kingships*: Jones (1978) 118-22; Moles (1983a) *passim*; (1990) *passim*.

¹¹ Von Arnim (1898) 331, 334; Jones (1978) 53-4, 135; Sheppard (1984) 162, 173; further support for a post-exilic dating in sustained parallels with the *Kingships* (nn.10, 101), especially *Or.* 1 (nn.117, 122, 129, 135, 143, 183, 186, 189, 217, 220), crucial parallels with *Or.* 79 (p. 129), and points of contact with *Olympicus* (nn.192, 219) and *Or.* 72 (n.167); *contra* n.133.

¹² Häslér (1935) 37, 55; Doblehofer (1987) 42.

¹³ Verrengia (2000) 87-8, 135.

¹⁴ Claassen (1999) 25, 166.

¹⁵ Whitmarsh (2001) 160-2.

¹⁶ Whitmarsh (2001) 142-5, 151 (Musonius); 172, 175-8 (Favorinus); Socrates’/Dio’s rejection of the *epitaphios* tradition (23-6) is particularly relevant; on that tradition within exile literature: Whitmarsh (2001) 175-7.

¹⁷ Jouan (1993b).

¹⁸ Similarly, the *Borystheniticus*: Schofield (1991) 57-92; Moles (1995b), esp. 191; and the *Euboicus*: Moles (1995b) 178-9.

¹⁹ 19, 23 ~ *Nub.* 965, 967, 985-6 (p. 130).

²⁰ 4 ~ *Od.* 1.48-59; 81; 10 ~ *Od.* 11.119-34; 10-11: p. 123 and n.121.

²¹ Cf. the shrewd allusion of Dio’s biographer Philostratus (*VS* 488) to ‘the man’s going off stage [*parodos*] to the Getic tribes’; 1 ~ Hdt. 1.32.1; 2-4 ~ Diog. Laert. 6.38 (Diogenes’ tragic verses); 2, 20 (emphasis on δυστυχία); 5 ~ Soph. *El.* 233-6 (note τόπον for the MSS νόμον); 14 (‘like a god from a machine’); 20-1 (disquisition on tragedy).

²² P. 124.

²³ 1 ~ Hdt. 1.32; 1 (Scythian royal burials) ~ Hdt. 4.71.4; 6-8 ~ Hdt. 1.55; 1 ~ Thuc. 5.26; 6 ~ Thuc. 1.70.3; 15 ~ Thuc. 1.22.

purpose, and having particular concern with ‘the city’, its authority deriving from the author’s exilic status.²⁴ The σπουδαιογέλοιον (‘serio-comic’) tradition is also relevant.²⁵

Generically, then, the speech is richly creative and complex.

PHILOSOPHICAL MATERIAL

Dio’s consultation of Delphi reflects Chaerephon’s consultation on behalf of Socrates. His reactions to the oracle largely imitate Plato’s *Apology*.²⁶ There are other extended traces of that work²⁷ and nods also at the Socrates of the *Gorgias*.²⁸

The Delphic narrative also evokes the (pseudo-)biographies of Diogenes and Zeno.²⁹ Exile as the trigger of philosophizing further recalls Diogenes,³⁰ and there are other plausible Diogenic traces.³¹

The Socratic *logos* (14-28) raises huge controversy. The closeness of 14-17 to the *Cleitophon*³² makes many scholars think that Dio is following it directly,³³ but others that Antisthenes is the common source.³⁴

This dispute is one of the key elements in the general debate concerning the presence or absence of Antisthenes in Dio, a debate which connects with two others: the extent of Cynic influence on Dio and the importance within the general Socratic tradition of Antisthenes himself. Brancacci has recently reaffirmed Dio’s extensive use of Antisthenes, notably in the *Third* and *Fourth Kingships* and in *Or.* 13, whereas Trapp sees Plato as the dominant source. This disagreement concerns also the *kind* of Socrates projected in the sources and inherited by Dio, with Brancacci insisting on a distinctively Antisthenic/Cynic/Dionian Socrates *qua* dogmatic teacher of positive moral truths and Trapp denying that distinctiveness.³⁵ The dispute affects the interpretation of *Or.* 13 and cannot be evaded.

The verbal resemblances are as shown below.

<i>Or.</i> 13	<i>Cleitophon</i>
(1 – description of Socrates) ‘shouting and straining his voice’ (14)	‘you hymned as you spoke’ (407a)
(2 – description of Socrates) ‘like a god from a machine, as someone has said’ (14)	‘like a god on a tragic machine’ (407a)
(3 – description of Socrates) ‘censuring’ (16)	‘when you censured’ (407a)

²⁴ 1 ~ Thuc. 5.26.

²⁵ P. 134.

²⁶ Detail in Moles (1978) 99, *cf.* also von Arnim (1898) 227; Verrengia (2000) 137; Trapp (2000) 231; Whitmarsh (2001) 162 and n.114; *contra* Brancacci (2000) 249; Momigliano (1969) 261, followed by Jones (1978) 47, detects Xen. *An.* 3.1.5-8; implausibly: Verrengia (2000) 137.

²⁷ 14 ~ *Ap.* 29d (Cohoon (1939) 101 n.2; Whitmarsh (2001) 163 n.116), perhaps also ~ *Clit.* 407e (Verrengia (2000) 147); 28 ~ *Ap.* 30a-b, 36c (*cf.* also 31b, 24d-25a); 33 ~ *Ap.* 36d.

²⁸ E.g. 29, *cf.* 14 ~ *Gorg.* 509a (though also ~ Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.5-6, cited by Dio himself in 3.26-7).

²⁹ Moles (1978) 99; Jones (1978) 47.

³⁰ Diog. Laert. 6.21, 49.

³¹ E.g. 2-5 ~ Diog. Laert. 6.38; 33 ~ Diog. Laert. 6.29, with Höistad (1948) 116-26; Diogenes’ writings survived and Dio read him: Giannantoni (1990) 4.484; Moles (2001).

³² Genuine?: hesitantly, Slings (1999) 215-34; no matter here: authenticity was anciently accepted.

³³ Hagen (1891); Wegehaupt (1896) 56-64; Desideri (1978) 253 n.3; Claassen (1999) 167; Slings (1999) 94-6; Trapp (2000) 231, 234; Verrengia (2000) 88-91; Whitmarsh (2001) 163-4.

³⁴ Dümmler (1882) 8-11; (1889) 1-17; von Arnim (1898) 256-60; Caizzi (1966) 92ff.; Giannantoni (1990) 4.350-3, *cf.* V A 208; Brancacci (1992) 3310 n.3; (2000) 251-2.

³⁵ Brancacci (2000); Trapp (2000), esp. 233 and n.59.

(4 – Socrates starts speaking) ‘Where are you rushing to, human beings?’ (16)	‘Where are you rushing to, human beings?’ (407b)
(5) ‘Do you not know that you are doing none of the things that are necessary, in concerning yourselves with money and trying to acquire it in every way, in order that you may have it in abundance yourselves and may hand it down in even greater quantity to your children? But of the children themselves and before them of yourselves, their fathers, you have all alike had no concern, having found no adequate or helpful training whereby you will be able to use your money rightly and justly and not harmfully and unjustly and yourselves without penalty, which you should have considered a more serious matter than money and your sons and daughters and wives and brothers and friends, and they also you.’ (16)	‘Do you not know that you are doing none of the things that are necessary, in as much as you make all your serious efforts at getting money but you have no concern if your sons, to whom you will be handing it down, will not know how to use it justly, nor do you find them teachers of justice, if it can be learned, or if it can be acquired by exercise or training, people who will train them or exercise them adequately, nor even before did you take care of yourselves in that way.’ (407b)
(6) ‘But is it by learning from your parents – and teaching your sons – lyre-playing, wrestling and letters that you think that you will inhabit your city in a more disciplined and better way?’ (17) ³⁶	‘But seeing that both you yourselves and your children have learned adequately letters, music and gymnastic, which things you hold to be a complete education for virtue, and then becoming no less bad concerning money, how do you not despise the present type of education and fail to seek those who will make you desist from this disharmony? It is actually because of this lack of tunefulness and negligence – and not because of the lack of co-ordination between foot and lyre – that brother behaves towards brother and cities towards cities without co-ordination or harmony, engaging in strife and warring and doing and suffering the most extreme things.’ (407c-d)

Items 2-5 are very close, and so is item 1.³⁷ Any *πεπαιδευμένος* must take Dio’s ‘as someone has said’ (item 2) for a ‘pointer’ to the very popular *Cleitophon*.³⁸ Item 6 is also close. While the positive ‘good teacher’ theme of 407c-d does not appear in the Socratic *logos*, it does appear when Dio is speaking *in propria persona* (31ff.): seemingly, Dio himself has transferred it there,³⁹ to fit the speech’s general movement from negative to positive.⁴⁰ Thus Dio is here following the *Cleitophon* directly.

The rest of the Socratic *logos* (17-28) enlarges on the inadequacy of conventional education. Dio is writing freely.⁴¹ The refutation (23-7) of the claim that Athens’ military victories showed her superior education controverts the *epitaphios*. The anachronistic allusion in 26 to Cnidus, taken by Cobet as illustrating the historical ignorance of later rhetoricians and sophists and by von Arnim and Giannantoni as showing Dio’s uncritical reliance on a text written after 394 BC,⁴²

³⁶ Textual problems in 16 and 17 (Verrengia (2000) 149-53) are immaterial.

³⁷ Because Dio, ps.-Plut. 4e and Epict. 3.22.26 all understand Socrates here to be ‘shouting’: Slings (1999) 95.

³⁸ The formula in Dio: Slings (1999) 95 n.174.

³⁹ Slings (1999) 94.

⁴⁰ P. 124.

⁴¹ Desideri (1978) 253 n.3; Slings (1999) 94, 96; *pace* Trapp (2000) 234 n.62 and Wegehaupt (1896) 57-63.

⁴² Cobet (1878) 65; von Arnim (1898) 258; Giannantoni (1990) 4.350-1.

is better explained as sophisticated imitation of Platonic anachronisms in the *Menexenus* and *Symposium*.⁴³

If there is no Antisthenic influence on the Socratic *logos*, the final part of the speech certainly contains Antisthenic elements.

One is Archelaus' invitation to Socrates (30), only recorded in Antisthenes' *Archelaus*.⁴⁴ A second case, not noticed hitherto,⁴⁵ requires lengthy demonstration, but has important consequences.

The speech's closing words (already quoted) distinguish between true philosophical education, which is 'not difficult', and the Romans' military expertise, represented as a kind of education: 'I did *not*, however, say that it was *difficult* for them to be *educated*, "since" (I maintained), "when you were better than nobody in the past, you *learned easily all the other things* that you wished. I speak of horsemanship, bowmanship and hoplite warfare".'

Now, an Antisthenic fragment (Themist. *De virt.* p. 43 Mach) runs:⁴⁶

But if you wish truly to learn that wisdom is something lofty, I invoke neither Plato nor Aristotle as witnesses, but the wise Antisthenes, who taught this road. For he says that Prometheus spoke to Heracles as follows: 'Your labour is very cheap, in that your care is for human things, but you have deserted the care of those things which are of greater moment; for you will not be a perfect man until you have learnt the things that are loftier than human beings, but if you learn those things, then you will learn also human things; if, however, you learn only human things, you will wander like a brute animal.' For the man who studies human things and confines the wisdom and intelligence of his mind in such cheap and narrow things, that man, as Antisthenes said, is not a wise man but like to an animal, to whom a dung-pit is pleasing. In truth, all celestial things are lofty and it behoves us to have a lofty way of thinking about them.

This must come from Antisthenes' *Heracles*. The scene reworks the Prodican Choice of Heracles, with an admixture of the Aeschylean interpretation of the relationship between Prometheus (~ intelligence) and Zeus (~ power).⁴⁷ The choice is between 'human' and 'celestial' 'learning' and is not absolute: 'learning' only the former will leave Heracles in a bestial state; 'learning' the latter is far the more important, but will immediately secure the former; Heracles will then be a 'perfect man'.

A passage in Dio's *Fourth Kingship* (Diogenes the Cynic is the dramatic speaker) contains the following elements (29-33):

- (i) the 'double *paideia*', one part of which is divine, the other human, the former superior and 'easy', the latter inferior, but both necessary for complete education;
- (ii) the claim that knowledge of the divine *paideia* easily confers knowledge of the human;
- (iii) Heracles as representative of divine education;
- (iv) the sophists, including Prometheus, as representative of human education;
- (v) road imagery (good and bad roads);
- (vi) comparison between human education/sophists and animals.

Many have taken this passage as Antisthenic.⁴⁸ Trapp, however, holds that 4.29-33 is merely one of a series of items drawn from *Alcibiades I*, *ex hypothesi* the Platonic 'master-text' of the

⁴³ *Menex.* 244d-46a (including Cnidus) and *Symp.* 182b and 193a (which Dio noted: Moles (2000a) 201 n.37).

⁴⁴ Dümmler (1882) 8-11; Giannantoni (1990) 4.350; Brancacci (2000) 249-50.

⁴⁵ Höistad (1948) 171-3 argues a plausible *general* case for Antisthenes' 'double *paideia*' in *Or.* 13; *cf.* also n.69.

⁴⁶ Antisthenes F27 Caizzi; V A 96 Giannantoni; Moles (2001) and (2003b).

⁴⁷ Kitto (1961) 61.

⁴⁸ Dümmler (1882) 14; Weber (1887) 241; von Fritz (1926) 78; Höistad (1948) 56-9; Moles (1983a) 270; Brancacci (2000) 254-5; Giannantoni (1990) 4.312-13; Whitmarsh (2001) 191 n.43.

Fourth Kingship.⁴⁹ The parallels adduced by Trapp prove that Dio is indeed so using *Alcibiades I*, though this hardly diminishes the Cynic extremeness of his own speech.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, of the six itemized elements, (i), (ii), (iii), (v) and (vi) are found in the fragment, and the emphasis on philosophical ‘easiness’ is characteristically Cynic⁵¹ (there is even a verbal parallel here). By contrast, *Alcibiades I* lacks not only the emphasis on ‘easiness’ but also the sharp distinction between human and divine education, the extended Heracles exemplum, the motif of the two roads and the comparison of human education to animals.

Or. 4.29ff., then, reflects Antisthenes’ double *paideia* and the verbal parallel shows that Dio had himself read the *Heracles*.

Now *Or.* 13.37 resembles Antisthenes’ double *paideia* in the distinction between two types of education (the only two envisaged),⁵² of which the first is the true education and the second is allowed only limited utility; the emphasis on the ‘easiness’ of the educational programme; and the thought that ‘if you’ve got the one form of education, the other follows’. Antisthenic influence coheres with the implicit commendation of moral ‘strength’,⁵³ with Dio’s earlier use of Antisthenes at 30, and with his use of the Antisthenic *paideia* in *Or.* 4.29ff. and elsewhere.⁵⁴

The passage, however, differs from Antisthenes’ double *paideia* in four respects. First, the two types of education are not distinguished in terms of ‘divine’ and ‘human’. Second, the non-philosophical education is not conventional education but military expertise. Third, conventional education is accorded not slight value but, implicitly, no value at all. Fourth, whereas in Antisthenes possession of the philosophical education allows the ‘easy’ acquisition of the non-philosophical education, here the pattern is reversed.

But these differences are explicable. The true education is generally sanctioned by the divine in *Or.* 13.⁵⁵ As Dio addresses the Romans and substitutes their military supremacy for conventional education, he is trading on two assumptions: first, that the Romans do power, not culture, which is left to the Greeks;⁵⁶ second, that there is some affinity between Roman virtue and Cynic virtue.⁵⁷ Thus the Romans’ military supremacy and the alleged ‘ease’ with which they acquired it indicate the ‘ease’ with which they can acquire the true philosophical education, and the reversal of the Antisthenic pattern has further protreptic force. The implicit dismissal of conventional education also accords with the more radically Cynic or Diogenic position⁵⁸ that the speech as a whole adopts on this issue. Finally, to increase the complications, I believe that *Or.* 13.37 also engages with *Aeneid* 6.847ff.⁵⁹ In sum, Antisthenes’ double *paideia* underlies *Or.* 13.37 and Dio’s adaptation of it shows great didactic resourcefulness.

So much for specific philosophical sources.⁶⁰

The general ‘feel’ of the speech is Cynic:⁶¹ witness the evocations of Diogenes; Dio’s emphasis on his humble attire,⁶² ‘self-chastening’ and ‘wandering’, and on others’ calling him a vagabond and tramp as well as a philosopher (10-12);⁶³ the appeal to the Scythians⁶⁴ and

⁴⁹ Trapp (2000) 226-7, cf. 232-4; the authenticity of *Alcibiades I* (advocated by Denyer (2001) 14-26) is here immaterial, authenticity being anciently accepted.

⁵⁰ Höistad (1948) 213-20; Moles (1983a), esp. 268-9 n.65.

⁵¹ E.g. Diog. Laert. 6.44, 70; Antisthenes and Cynicism: p. 119; ‘easiness’ in *Or.* 13: p. 123.

⁵² Similarly 24, where the Persians have no education but some military ‘training’, a significantly parallel passage, as it emerges (nn.115, 156).

⁵³ P. 122; in Antisthenes, e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.2, 6.14-15.

⁵⁴ Höistad (1948) 50-7, 86-94; note that *Or.* 4 is a year earlier than *Or.* 13 (nn.11, 101).

⁵⁵ P. 123.

⁵⁶ Virg. *Aen.* 6.847-53; Petrochilos (1974) 58-62; Whitmarsh (2001) 9-17.

⁵⁷ Griffin (1993) 251-8; (1996) 197-204.

⁵⁸ Diog. Laert. 6.73, 103-4.

⁵⁹ Space, however, precludes discussion of this possibility here: Moles (2003b).

⁶⁰ Whitmarsh’s claim that Dio is engaging with Musonius’ Περὶ φουγῆς: p. 121; another possibility: n.140.

⁶¹ Dudley (1937) 150-1; Moles (1978) 99-100; Jouan (1993a) 393.

⁶² Cf., e.g., Kindstrand (1976) 161-3; p. 135.

⁶³ Dio’s Cynicizing representation of his wanderings: 1.9, 50-1; 4.1, 6-11 (Diogenes ~ Dio); 6.1ff. (Diogenes ~ Dio); 7.9, 81; 8.1 (Diogenes ~ Dio); 12.16-20; 19.1; 33.15; 36.1; 45.1; further Montiglio (2000) 98ff.

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Martin (1996).

Indians;⁶⁵ the implicit cosmopolitanism;⁶⁶ the advocacy of philosophical ‘strength’;⁶⁷ the central philosophical claim that things are ‘easy’;⁶⁸ the savage attacks on material things; and the basic philosophical message that individual and civic ‘good fortune’ is secured by ‘self-sufficiency’ (33-5).⁶⁹

Dio’s use of the *Apology* and the *Gorgias* hardly undermines this Cynic ‘feel’, since Socrates was generally appropriated within the Cynic tradition, and Dio’s Socrates differs from Plato’s in that he does not make the minimalizing claim that his wisdom consists only in the fact that he does not know but appears as a forthright exponent of positive moral doctrine. Thus, rightly, Brancacci.⁷⁰

Dio’s deployment of the *Cleitophon* is also apposite. Whereas that work’s Socrates is ironized by his inability to explain what virtue is,⁷¹ Dio largely discards the irony and uses the *Cleitophon* image of Socrates as a representative of moral virtue at its most robust and uncompromising. This procedure, also adopted by Dio’s fellow Stoic, Epictetus, in his *On Cynicism* (3.22.26), is philosophically justified, because the Socrates parodied in the *Cleitophon* was very like the Socrates championed by the Cynics and by Antisthenes. Use of the *Cleitophon* also underwrites the move from individual ethics to social and political ones.

Use of Antisthenes is also compatible with the Cynic ‘feel’ of the speech, since, whoever founded Cynicism, Antisthenes undoubtedly influenced it,⁷² as Dio knew.⁷³ On the whole, *Or.* 13 inclines towards the ‘soft’, here Antisthenic, type of Cynicism, which (here) involves the acceptance of human beings’ social and political obligations, however redefined, and an intense concern with the well-being of ‘the city’, rather than towards the ‘hard’ Diogenic version.

More generally, Dio’s rich play with the metaphorical and moral implications of place and travel⁷⁴ can be regarded as Platonic⁷⁵ and/or Herodotean,⁷⁶ although such play is also found within Cynicism, albeit in less developed form.⁷⁷

Discussion of *Or.* 13’s philosophical content must tackle the question of irony. A certain degree of ironization is intrinsic alike to the model of the Cynicized Socrates and to the self-representation of the Cynic himself;⁷⁸ hence these elements are ‘always already’ present both in Dio’s representation of Socrates and in his self-representation. Nevertheless, Dio has *somewhat* increased that irony by introducing the sorts of equivocation highlighted by Whitmarsh,⁷⁹ including the characterization of Socratic doctrine and of himself, Dio, as ‘old’/‘old-fashioned’ (*archaios*):

(14) ... while I was upbraiding all the others and first and most of all myself in these and similar ways, sometimes through lack of resources I would go to a certain old *logos*, spoken by a certain Socrates ...

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Brown (1949) 38-51; Moles (1995a) 146-9.

⁶⁶ Moles (1993); (1996); *pace* Montiglio (2000) 99-100.

⁶⁷ P. 122.

⁶⁸ N.51 and p. 123.

⁶⁹ Though extant Dio does not use the word ἀντάρκεια, he often comes close, as at 34-5: ἐλαττόνων ... δεήσεσθε (virtually the standard definition). Dio’s formulations hereabouts resemble Diog. Laert. 6.11 (Antisthenes); I suspect implicit punning on ἀντ/ἀρκεια/self-ἀρχή, as perhaps in Plato (e.g. *Rep.* 369b; *Polit.* 271d) and (surely) in lost Cynic material. Dio’s thinking about this idea: Brenk (2000).

⁷⁰ Brancacci (2000) 249.

⁷¹ Slings (1999) 209-12.

⁷² Dudley (1937) 1-15, 54-5; Giannantoni (1990) 4.223-33; (1993); Moles (2000b) 417 (all favouring

Diogenes); Diog. Laert. 6.2; Höistad (1948) 10-11; Döring (1995); Goulet-Cazé (1996) 414-15 (favouring Antisthenes); influence: von Fritz (1927); Döring (1995).

⁷³ *Or.* 8.1, with Brancacci (2000) 256-7.

⁷⁴ P. 122.

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Pender (1999).

⁷⁶ See, e.g., Redfield (1985).

⁷⁷ Diog. Laert. 6.73 with Moles (1995a) 139-40; Diog. Laert. 6.37, 68.

⁷⁸ Cynic theatricality and exaggeration (both developments of Socratic characteristics) and their clear pro-treptic/paideutic justification: Diog. Laert. 6.35; Kindstrand (1976) 208-9; Moles (1983a) 274-6; (1983b) 108-9; p. 000 below; *contra* Branham (1996); *cf.* also the *spoudaiogeloion*: n.204.

⁷⁹ Whitmarsh (2001) 160-7.

(29) ... so to all the others I used to say practically the same things [as Socrates did], things old/old-fashioned and stale,⁸⁰ and when they would not let me be at peace when I got to⁸¹ Rome itself, I did not dare to speak any word of my own, fearing lest I be laughed to scorn and seem a fool, in as much as I was fully conscious of my own great old-fashionedness and lack of learning.

This irony requires further consideration,⁸² but it is important to note here that Dio's appeal to an 'old *logos*' falls within a broad philosophical tradition which grounds itself in 'ancient wisdom'.⁸³ This move is often made by Cynics,⁸⁴ and repeatedly by Dio himself.⁸⁵

From this survey *Or.* 13 emerges as philosophically erudite and resourceful.⁸⁶

HISTORICAL PROBLEMS

There are three: (a) who was the Roman whose fall caused Dio's exile? (b) Where was Dio exiled from? (c) How reliable is Dio's account of his becoming a philosopher? All three historical problems have important interpretative implications.

(a) Possibilities are: Q. Iunius Arulenus Rusticus; M. Arrecinus Clemens; L. Salvius Otho Cocceianus; T. Flavius Sabinus; *non liquet*.⁸⁷

The crucial passage has already been quoted.⁸⁸ There are two criteria: (i) the man must be closely related to the Flavians;⁸⁹ (ii) Dio's exile was long.⁹⁰ Rusticus, killed in, or shortly before, 93,⁹¹ is excluded by (i) and (ii). Clemens, executed in 93, is excluded by (ii). Otho Cocceianus is excluded by (i). Sabinus, cousin of Domitian and *cos.* 82, the year of his death,⁹² satisfies both criteria, as do also Dio's Flavian contacts.⁹³ The man's identity and the date of Dio's exile are worth (re-)establishing for the historical reconstruction of Dio's early career.

But a problem remains. Was Dio *in fact* Sabinus' φίλος/*amicus* and σύμβουλος/*consiliarius*? Is Dio admitting this or merely recording the charge and then, while implying Sabinus' innocence, either leaving the truth of the alleged relationship between himself and Sabinus open or implying its non-existence? Verrengia takes λεγομένης as 'cosiddetta' and comments: 'da tale amicizia Dione intende prendere le distanze'.⁹⁴ On this reading, δὴ is presumably also distancing.⁹⁵ On the usual reading, however, these words merely gloss the charges as *stated*.⁹⁶

Since Dio characterizes Sabinus as 'not base' and compares himself to Scythian kings' cup-bearers, cooks or concubines, he is not denying that he 'knew' Sabinus. He represents Sabinus (*qua* 'not base') as innocent; Sabinus' innocence necessarily makes Dio also innocent, but his innocence seems to exceed this: Scythian cup-bearers, cooks and concubines are not kings' friends and counsellors, and the αἰτία made against Dio was without αἰτία (even on its own terms, 'without cause'). Thus λεγομένης and δὴ do have a distancing quality. Dio is representing himself as legally cleaner than clean, though the full implications of this dextrous passage only

⁸⁰ ἔωλα (Capps) is certain: cf. *Or.* 12.12 (with Russell (1992) 169).

⁸¹ Translation: p. 124.

⁸² P. 132.

⁸³ Boys-Stones (2001).

⁸⁴ Moles (1983b) 116 and n.103; Boys-Stones (2001) 7-8, 13-14, 24-5.

⁸⁵ 1.8, 53, 75; 3.1-3; 11.37; 12.12, 27-8; 36.34, 58-60; 72.11-12, 15-16; Desideri (1978) 351 n.14; Moles (1990) 308, 321, 368 n.40, 370 n.79; Swain (1996) 202-5.

⁸⁶ Pace Long (2002) 123: 'Dio's recourse to Socrates is trite and self-serving.'

⁸⁷ Respectively, Mommsen (1869) 84 n.4; Jones (1990); Sidebottom (1996) 451-2; Emperius (1847) 103-8, followed by von Arnim (1898) 223ff.; Jones (1978) 46;

Desideri (1978) 189; Moles (1978) 93; (2003a) 190-1; *non liquet*: Schmid (1903) 852; Swain (1996) 189 n.8; Verrengia (2000) 66-77 (useful overview).

⁸⁸ P. 113.

⁸⁹ P. 113.

⁹⁰ 12.16; 40.2, 12; 45.10.

⁹¹ Verrengia (2000) 70-1.

⁹² Verrengia (2000) 70 n.16; 76-7.

⁹³ N. 6; my treatment meets Verrengia's difficulties ((2000) 76-7).

⁹⁴ Verrengia (2000) 68 and n.8.

⁹⁵ Denniston (1954) 230.

⁹⁶ Von Arnim (1898) 228; Cohoon (1939) 91; Desideri (1978) 188; cf. Denniston (1954) 234-5.

become clear later.⁹⁷ As to the facts, Dio admits that he knew Sabinus; his implicit denial that he was his friend or counsellor, doubly motivated as it is, does not establish a historical negative. I conclude that Dio was close to Sabinus. Dio had the highest court contacts and his fall was mighty.

(b) Where was Dio exiled from? Prusa, certainly (*Or.* 19.1-2); on the usual forms of exile, also Bithynia, *qua* province, and Rome and Italy, *qua communis patria* of Roman citizens.⁹⁸ But Desideri has repeatedly maintained that Dio's exile took the lighter form of *civitate pellere*, since sections 29ff. have Dio philosophizing in Rome.⁹⁹ These sections are usually read as referring to Dio's philosophizing after his recall and return to Rome in 99/100,¹⁰⁰ when he philosophized before Trajan among others.¹⁰¹ Resolution of this problem must be deferred.¹⁰²

(c) How reliable is Dio's account of his becoming a philosopher?

Simple acceptance¹⁰³ is immediately threatened by the elaborate Socratic, Diogenic, Antisthenic, Zenonian and Cynic associations which Dio invokes.¹⁰⁴ There is every reason to accept Fronto's testimony that Dio learnt philosophy from Musonius Rufus, i.e. before the exile.¹⁰⁵ Hence another reading of the speech: as a self-serving rewriting of Dio's autobiography. By post-dating his philosophizing, Dio buries his early pupillage under Musonius, his unsavoury oscillations between philosophy and sophistry and his collaboration with Vespasian's campaign against philosophers in 71.¹⁰⁶ From these perspectives, *Or.* 13 conveys a most misleading impression.

What, then, of Whitmarsh's claim that Dio is here engaged in a Freudian/Bloomian struggle for 'authority' with his teacher, Musonius?¹⁰⁷ Since another of Dio's works alludes obliquely to Musonius,¹⁰⁸ some other works show Musonian influence,¹⁰⁹ and Musonius' *Περὶ φυγῆς* was in Greek, Dio 'the man' can hardly have been unconscious of his master's voice. But it is another question whether Musonius is 'in the text'. There are no significant parallels nor any 'contradictions' so sharp as to imply polemic. Any active presence of Musonius would sabotage the narrative's basic credibility.¹¹⁰

Thus on the general issue of when and how he became a philosopher Dio should still be convicted of disingenuousness. This, however, does not provide a sufficient explanation of the speech or even of the function within it of Dio's autobiography.¹¹¹

The important question of the historicity of the consultation of Delphi involves so many other questions that I defer it.¹¹²

⁹⁷ P. 123.

⁹⁸ Verrengia (2000) 83.

⁹⁹ Desideri (1978) 193, 241-2 n.50; accepted by Whitmarsh (2001) 157 n.89.

¹⁰⁰ Von Arnim (1898) 256, 332; Jones (1978) 53, 128; Sheppard (1984) 162; Verrengia (2000) 79.

¹⁰¹ Reaffirmation of delivery to Trajan as the primary context for the *Kingships*: Moles (2003a) 195-201, cf. Salmeri (2000) 89-91; *contra* Whitmarsh (2001) 186-216, 325-7; the *a priori* plausibility of such contexts: Haake (2003); the dating 99/100: Salmeri, *loc. cit.*; Moles (2003a) 196; other philosophical contexts: p. 129.

¹⁰² P. 124.

¹⁰³ Nock (1933) 173-4; Kindstrand (1978); Blomqvist (1989) 225-6, 232.

¹⁰⁴ Pp. 115-20.

¹⁰⁵ Fronto 2.50 Haines = 135 van den Hout; Moles (1978) 82, 86; nn.108-9.

¹⁰⁶ Moles (1978), esp. 96-100.

¹⁰⁷ Whitmarsh (2001) 137, 164 ('the master-pupil relationship ... has been translated into a contest of the symbolic terrain of literary tropes and allusions').

¹⁰⁸ 31.122 with, e.g., Moles (1978) 82-3; Whitmarsh (2001) 137 n.16.

¹⁰⁹ Geytenbeek (1963) 14-15; Brunt (1973); Russell (1992) 150; Blomqvist (1995) 187; Houser (1998) 257-8; Hawley (2000) 136-7; Brenk (2000) 262-6.

¹¹⁰ The nearest 'parallel' is the rejection of the play 'Rome' ~ 'strength' (Musonius *fr.* 9, p. 44 Hense; p. 122; n.113), but this move is commonplace. As to the *general* explanatory force of Whitmarsh's claim, I am sceptical.

¹¹¹ Pp. 123 and 133.

¹¹² P. 126.

MAIN THEMES

I here summarize main themes and note interconnections, without prejudging ultimate interpretative questions:

(a) Place. Like all exiles, Dio faces the question: where can the ‘displaced’ exile ‘place’ himself (5)? The speech ends with Rome as the central ‘place’ of the world’s riches (36). Place can also be metaphorical: Apollo’s oracular reply in 9 is ἄτοπος – seemingly, ‘out of place’. Physical place is less important than moral place. Even at the end, Rome will not be truly ‘strong’ (34) – with the standard pun,¹¹³ unless she ‘renames’ herself under Dio’s philosophical programme by reducing her luxury, consumption and very population, thereby becoming a smaller place (34-5). Places, too, are not what they seem: Rome under Domitian resembles Scythia at its most barbarous (1), or Athens rent by war or *stasis* (1, 6);¹¹⁴ similarly, Socrates’ description of Persia under Xerxes (24) eerily evokes Rome under Domitian.¹¹⁵

(b) Travel. Dio, like many exiles, must ‘wander’. He consults Delphi because Apollo is a ἱκανὸς σύμβολος (9): he can ‘reach’ the right advice or help humans to ‘reach’ the right goal (ἱκανός ~ ἱκνέομαι).¹¹⁶ By contrast, ordinary politicians are not ‘competent to give advice’ (22). Τὸ ἱκανόν becomes one of the speech’s philosophical *desiderata* (9, 16, 19, 22, 27, 32). Travel can be *both* literal and moral/metaphorical *or* simply metaphorical (13, 16, 19). The speech itself becomes a philosophical journey. When Dio starts his philosophical preaching (14), he ‘goes to’ an old, Socratic *logos*, and it is the ‘old’ *logos* of the Cynicized Socrates which enables the moral progress of Dio himself and of his individual listeners as he wanders and which is finally capable of saving Rome (29ff.).¹¹⁷

The horizontal movement of travel is matched by vertical movement downwards through time (16, etc.). The acme of the travel imagery is reached in 35, where Dio expatiates on the rewards the Romans will gain ‘when you have reached the peak of virtue’, a phrase which combines horizontal movement and vertical movement, and vertical movement in two senses: upwards to a peak of virtue and upwards in time.

The imagery of (a) and (b) is, indeed, almost all-pervasive, and, once established, energizes ordinarily inert words. For example, in 13 ‘the present evils, great ignorance and disturbance’ and in 32 ‘the unchastenedness and havingness’ are, as it were, ‘places’ to get away from. συμβαίνω, a *leitmotiv* of the speech (1, 6 [bis], 12, 26), is similarly energized: moral problems involve not only human beings as agents, who have to progress in the right way, but also as passive before challenges which come from the outside. Ultimately, therefore, exile, wanderings and travel, while literal enough, are also metaphors for moral states or aspirations. By contrast, place, while sometimes also metaphorical, retains important literal force in the case of Rome, though she too has to ‘re-place’ herself morally.

In this Dionian speech, as in others,¹¹⁸ the relationships between literal, metaphorical and textual places and travels present puzzles. Apollo’s oracle to Dio, seemingly ‘out of place’, is (9) ‘not easy to put together’ (συμβαλεῖν). Apollo, *qua* ἱκανὸς σύμβουλος, tells Dio to keep on wandering until he comes to the last place on earth, just as – Dio reflects – Teiresias, *qua* σύμβουλος, told Odysseus to wander until he ‘met together with’ (συμβάλλη) people ‘who knew not the sea even by hearsay’. There are insistent and suitably oracular verbal plays. Apollo poses a prophetic puzzle both for Dio, *qua* dramatic character, and for Dio’s audience/readers to ‘put together’.

¹¹³ Erskine (1995); Whitmarsh (2001) 21, 149; *cf.* n.110 above.

¹¹⁴ N.23.

¹¹⁵ Domitianic are: (a) the Persian king (*cf.* *Orr.* 4 and 6; von Arnim (1898) 261-2; Desideri (1978) 202, 244 n.5, 288); (b) the tiara (*cf.* 1.79; 3.41; 4.25, 61); (c) the evil *daimon* (*cf.* 45.1); (d) the alleged military incompetence.

¹¹⁶ *Cf.* 30.1, 45 with Moles (2000a) 197-8.

¹¹⁷ The same enabling role of *logos* in the *First Kingship* (Moles (1990) 311, 322, 325-6) and the *Charidemus* (Moles (2000a) 197-8); *cf.* the related ‘wandering physically’/‘wandering in words’ (4.37; 7.1, 127; 12.16; Moles (1995b) 179; Whitmarsh (2001) 160).

¹¹⁸ P. 126.

(c) The search for a competent philosophical counsellor. Τὸ βουλευέσθαι is another *leitmotiv* (1, 6, 8, 9, 11, 19, 22, 23, 24). Right decisions require the help of a competent σύμβουλος: Apollo in relation to Croesus and Dio, Tiresias in relation to Odysseus (6-10). By the end, the σύμβουλος is transformed into a more explicit διδάσκαλος (32, *cf.* 17). This theme adds another dimension to Dio's veiled and equivocal allusion to Sabinus (1). Dio's implicit denial that their association extended to friendship and counsel *adumbrates* an *ideal* counsellor/friend relationship. Dio has now left behind the glittering, meretricious world of high-level politicking.

(d) The search for the right education. This theme first becomes explicit in the Socratic *logos* section, which it proceeds to dominate (16ff.; 23; 24-6). Similarly, Dio in Rome argues the need for good education and good teachers (31-3), and ends by expounding the Antisthenic double *paideia* (37). But the theme is latent from the very beginning of the speech, as Dio turns first to literature and then to the Delphic oracle for guidance on the correct response to exile.

(e) In this speech, apart from the puzzling oracle, what seems hard is actually easy, both hard and easy being used both of worldly states and of the intellectual and moral capacities required to cope with them. Exile and all other similar disasters seem hard: they are actually easy to deal with (2-8). And the speech ends (37) with the Antisthenic 'double *paideia*', both elements of which are 'easy'.

(f) A related idea is that true philosophical virtues are the opposite of worldly values, characteristically those held by the ignorant majority (2, 7, 31). Exile, etc. are not evils: they are, in a way, goods: πόνος ἀγαθόν (Diog. Laert. 6.2). The shape of the speech again instantiates this moral lesson. Sabinus seems very close to the 'fortunate rulers', but they were not *really* fortunate, and by the end the only 'good fortune' and 'rule' that matter are *philosophical* 'good fortune' and *self-rule* (31, 33).

(g) Divine authority is stressed throughout: the δαιμόνιον (3), the various oracles, including Delphi (2, 6-10, 36). This does not mean that 'religion' is more important than 'philosophy':¹¹⁹ as in the Socratic-Antisthenic-Cynic philosophical tradition generally, the two are mutually implicated. The δαιμόνιον co-exists with human εὐδαιμονία. Xerxes/Domitian (24) is *alike* an 'evil spirit' *and* himself 'unfortunate' *and* the agent of 'misfortune' in others.

(h) As a dramatic figure within the text, Dio himself helps to knit together apparently disparate elements and to embody major themes. His unclarified relationship with Sabinus *adumbrates* the σύμβουλος and διδάσκαλος themes. His 'experiencing' of exile, his 'consultation' of Delphi and his and Socrates' sermons on the 'use' of wealth are all interlinked by the verb χρᾶσθαι (3, 9, 16, 23):¹²⁰ the right 'use' of apparent misfortune, of oracles and of material things is always the same thing: the right individual and collective response to external things, and Dio's initial apparent misfortune anticipates all the other problems. His poverty in exile prefigures Socrates' attacks upon Athenian materialism and his own attacks upon Roman materialism. His 'wandering' is itself morally ambiguous: it can be a symbol of folly, a route to wisdom, or itself already a form of 'truth' (ἀλητεία ~ ἀλήθεια).¹²¹ Dio dangles these alternatives in 10-11:

exhorting myself in this way [according to the example of Odysseus] neither to fear nor to be ashamed of the thing, and putting on humble dress and in all other respects chastening myself, I began to wander [ἡλώμην] everywhere. And the people who chanced to meet me, when they saw me, some of them called me a wanderer [ἀλήτην], but certain others actually a philosopher.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Pace Brenk (2000) 269-70.

¹²⁰ Similar play in *Or.* 10 (2ff.): both perhaps inspired by Hdt. 7.140-1 (p. 000 and n.147).

¹²¹ The ambiguity: Moles (1990) 309, 322; Montiglio (2000); Whitmarsh (2001) 162, 198-200; Hom. *Od.*

14.122-7; Hdt. 1.29.1-30.2; 4.76.2; Pl. *Apol.* 22a; Redfield (1985) 98-9.

¹²² Closely similar are 1.9 (Dio's self-introduction in the *First Kingship*), with Moles (1990) 309, and 72.2, 11.

And not only do Dio's experiences and reactions anticipate Socratic teachings, but he himself becomes the σύμβουλος of everybody whom he meets in the speech, including the Romans at the end. Dio's own education, which the speech traces, equips him for this task. There is another level on which Dio's self-representation is not just about himself: through the comparisons with Odysseus, with tragic figures and with tragic plots,¹²³ his wanderings acquire mythic status, and, though the effect is undoubtedly partly to sound Dio's own trumpet, it is also to shift the focus away from the personal towards the mythical and universalizing. As in other works (notably the *First Kingship*, *Euboicus*, *Diogenics* and *Charidemus*), Dio transmutes his own biography into rich philosophical myth.¹²⁴

(i) As much of the above material already suggests, the speech enacts a general movement of 'correction' or 'redefinition' of several of its key themes: from false 'good fortune', 'counsel', 'rule' and 'education' to true, from 'hardship' and 'difficulty' to 'easiness'. This process is in fact thoroughly comprehensive.¹²⁵

The sheer thematic density of Dio's writing, beneath its complaisant surface, is remarkable.

SPECIFIC INTERPRETATIVE PROBLEMS

There are two: (a) sections 29ff.; (b) section 9.

(a) There are strong objections to Desideri's claim that sections 29ff. show Dio philosophizing in Rome during the exile:¹²⁶

(1) Dio writes (29): 'so to the others I used to say practically the same things [as Socrates], things old-fashioned and stale, and when/since they would not let me be in peace when I got to Rome itself, I did not dare to speak any word of my own ...' Here 'the others' means 'everybody other than the Romans' and 'when I got to Rome' refers to a later time.¹²⁷ The clear implication that sections 29ff. mark the culmination of Dio's exile wanderings hardly fits the hypothesis that Dio was never exiled from Rome.

(2) In sections 30-1 Dio writes: 'Archelaus, king of the Macedonians ... summoned [Socrates] with the inducement of gifts and fees, that he might hear him speaking these words. In the same way I too tried to speak to the Romans, when they summoned me and asked me to speak.' This analogy between Archelaus' 'summoning' of Socrates and the Romans' 'summoning' of himself can hardly apply to Domitianic Rome.

(3) Dio elsewhere, in contexts where duplicity is unlikely and would have been risky (as damaging his credibility, or inviting ridicule, were his claims falsifiable), states, or implies, that, once exiled, he was absent from Rome for the rest of Domitian's reign and that his return was secured by Domitian's death and Nerva's accession.¹²⁸

However, if sections 29ff. refer to Dio's *post*-exile philosophizing in Rome, three questions arise: (i) how can Dio's exile narrative legitimately include allusion to his post-exilic philosophical activity in Rome? While it is easy to see that Dio might *want* to represent his philo-

¹²³ N. 21.

¹²⁴ Cf., respectively, Moles (1990) 305-37; Jouan (1977); (1993a); (1993b); Moles (1995b) 180; (2000a) 202-4.

¹²⁵ However, I failed to persuade Readers and Editor that the process is systematically 'keyed' by an elaborate series of ring-structures between beginning and end.

¹²⁶ P. 121 and n.99.

¹²⁷ Translation: Cohoon (1939) 115; Swain (1996) 212; *pace* Desideri (1978) 221; Verrengia (2000) 111; aorist of γίγνομαι plus ἐν as 'arrive at' is Classical and suitably Herodotean (p. 114): Hdt. 1.105, 189; 2.107; Powell (1938) 69.

¹²⁸ 1.50, with Moles (1990) 329; 46.2-3, with Moles (1984) 67-8; cf. Philostr. *VS* 487-9.

sophizing in Trajanic Rome as part of his whole philosophical project ever since he first became a philosopher, indeed as the culmination of his philosophical career,¹²⁹ how can he do this within the logic of this speech? (ii) How can Dio convey an allusion to his recall by Nerva and return to Rome under Trajan without explicitly alluding to them? (iii) How can he link the exile and post-exile phases of his career so as to imply both difference and continuity?

Question (i) is fundamental, and questions (ii) and (iii) concern Dio's technical skill. If sections 29ff. represent Dio's philosophizing in Rome as the culmination of his exile wanderings, then, since Socrates is a figure for Dio, it is easy to read *Archelaus* ('ruler of the people'), who 'summoned' Socrates, as an analogue of either Nerva, who recalled Dio to Rome,¹³⁰ or of Trajan, for whom Dio performed the σύμβουλος role that Archelaus had solicited from Socrates, or indeed of both Nerva and Trajan, such 'allegory', whether simple or double, being thoroughly Dionian, in the *Kingships* and elsewhere.¹³¹ The wording is suspiciously 'loaded': Archelaus 'knew many things and had associated with many of the wise' (like Nerva); 'he called him [Socrates] with presents and fees, in order that he might hear him saying these *logoi*'. 'These *logoi*', formally Socrates', can also be Dio's, 'now' or on similar occasions.¹³² Hence another ring-structure and contrast: between Rome at the beginning under the tyrannical Domitian and Rome at the end under the 'good' 'ruler' of his people, Nerva and/or Trajan, whose function is to bring Dio's philosophical teaching to the Romans at large. So 'the Romans summoned me' effectively implies: 'Nerva/Trajan gave me this huge philosophical commission'.¹³³ Hence also Dio's return becomes a metaphor not only for Trajan's celebrated 'repatriation' of philosophers and intellectuals¹³⁴ but also for the return from exile of the entire Roman world under Nerva and Trajan, and Dio's exile a metaphor for the exile of the spirit imposed on all his subjects by the 'evil δαίμων' Domitian, who frustrated his subjects' εὐδαιμονία (1, 24).¹³⁵

As for (i), part of the answer lies in Dio's response to Apollo's oracle to go to the ends of the earth. In a way, he did: he penetrated deeply into Dacia, Scythia and the Black Sea area, as presumably his audience knew and as he himself described in other works.¹³⁶ Such travel enhances his moral authority: as the wanderer *par excellence* who has travelled to the ends of the earth, he has done, and seen, it all. As the ultimate Cynic 'scout' (κατάσκοπος),¹³⁷ he is uniquely qualified to apply his experience to the task of reforming Rome, the central τόπος of the world (36). But it is not only a question of Dio's response to the oracle: it is also a question of the oracle's meaning.

(b) Apollo's oracle to Dio, seemingly 'out of place', was 'not easy to put together' (συμβάλλειν). Apollo told Dio to go to the last place on earth, as Teiresias told Odysseus to wander until he 'met together with [συμβάλλῃ] people who knew not the sea even by hearsay'.

¹²⁹ Cf. the *First Kingship*: 1.56-8 (the Arcadian prophetess).

¹³⁰ 45.2-3 with Moles (1984) 67-8.

¹³¹ Moles (1990), e.g. 328; (2000a) 206-7.

¹³² For the nicely blurred focalization, cf. 'this father' in the *Charidemus* (30.45): Moles (2000a) 205-6.

¹³³ A referee objects that 32-3 (on the ideal teacher to be established on 'the Acropolis') alludes both to Dio and Trajan and that 'it hasn't happened yet', hence an earlier Nerva/Trajan allusion in 30-1 is excluded and the speech is exilic. But: (i) other considerations make the speech post-exilic (p. 114; n.11); (ii) 32-3 is future in relation to 31, where Dio is already in Rome, not (or not necessarily) in relation to the delivery context; (iii) in Domitianic Rome Dio could hardly be publicly arguing, however allusively, for Domitian's removal; (iv) how could Dio then know that Trajan would replace Domitian (and

Nerva)? (v) nothing in the passage suggests violent change; (vi) Dio is surely alluding to himself (p. 133) but hardly also to Trajan (or any other potential emperor): this is a philosophical teacher. 'Establishment on the Acropolis' entails 'philosopher-ruler', but this is not 'Trajan as philosopher-king' but philosopher as philosopher-ἄρχων (= Dio as Trajan's court-philosopher), Trajan's ἀρχή having already been covered by 30 *Ἀρχέλαος*.

¹³⁴ Plin. *Pan.* 47.1-2.

¹³⁵ The *First Kingship* enacts the same philosophical/political narrative of 'mass exile': 1.55, with Moles (1990) 321, 370 n.82.

¹³⁶ 12.10-20; 36.1; Philostr. *VS* 487-9.

¹³⁷ Diog. Laert. 6.17-18; 6.43; Norden (1893) 373-85; Moles (1983b) 112; Schofield (2004) 453-5.

Now *Or.* 13, a text that relates wanderings and journeys, is itself a journey which Dio (and his listeners) have been making. Although he was exiled from Rome, Dio's last destination, at the end of the text, turns out to be Rome. At the beginning of the text Rome was like Scythia in a bad sense. At the end, if Rome is to be radically reinvented, she may need the services of a Scythian or Indian (32): she may need to become like the positive Cynic conceptions of Scythia and the Gymnosophists. Dio's real-life wanderings had taken him to the end of the earth: Dacia and Scythia. The end of the earth can be morally bad (Scythia as a tyranny) or morally good (Scythia as the location of Cynic perfection). But places and journeys are not only places and journeys: they are also metaphors. If Rome is to be morally regenerated, to become truly 'Rome', she must become like one of the 'good' countries at the end of the earth. From the point of view of Dio's *moral* journey, then, 'the last (bad) place on earth' is Rome itself.¹³⁸ Rome as the *end* of the earth is a thoroughly paradoxical conception, though not unparalleled,¹³⁹ but the provocative inversion of categories is characteristically Cynic and here facilitated by Scythia's switch from being morally bad to morally good.

It turns out, then, that Apollo was ultimately telling Dio to convert the Romans.¹⁴⁰ Hence the sense of fulfilment in 29 'when I got to Rome *itself*'. There is an important 'gap' in the text here: we must see that, after initial puzzlement (9), Dio eventually interpreted Apollo's oracle rightly. If, as a result of Dio's teaching, the Romans eventually 'come to the summit of virtue', this will be the vertical culmination of Dio's horizontal wanderings (the wording echoes 9 'until you come to the last place on earth').¹⁴¹ The application to Rome of Socratic teaching is similarly apposite: the best form of education has been 'handed down' in the place where it can be most useful. For its recipients to 'come to the summit of virtue', they have to go back in time to the true ἀρχή (both 'beginning' and 'rule'). The horizontal and vertical movements of the speech converge in the central τόπος of the world.¹⁴² The shape of the speech again instantiates the philosophical trajectory: progression from Rome entails regression to Rome.

This play with seemingly 'atopic' topology as the central structuring device of a speech is paralleled in the *First Kingship*, *Olympicus*, *Charidemus* and *Borystheniticus*;¹⁴³ and the use of the Delphic oracle to justify Dio's philosophical relationship with Nerva and Trajan is paralleled by the Arcadian prophetess as a device for bringing Dio before Trajan (1.49ff.).

What, at last, of the *historicity* of Dio's consultation of Delphi? Is this consultation – otherwise unattested in Dio – based on the Socrates, Zeno and Diogenes paradigms? How does Dio's encounter with the Arcadian prophetess, itself obviously invented,¹⁴⁴ affect the question? Would invention of the consultation of Delphi, if detected, have damaged Dio's credibility, or would such a fiction have been smilingly accepted by his sophisticated audience?

Oracle experts and some Dionian scholars take Dio's consultation and Delphi's reply as historical.¹⁴⁵ Jones, however, suggests: 'since Dio was in fact "at the end of the earth" when he was

¹³⁸ Fittingly, therefore, the negative allusion to Rome at 36 ('all the possessions from everywhere have been gathered together into this one place ...') *inverts* an encomiastic *topos* about the greatest cities, especially Rome (e.g. Plin. *NH* 3.39; Dio 32.36; Aristid. 46.23).

¹³⁹ N.140.

¹⁴⁰ Remarkably, *Or.* 13 parallels Luke, *Acts*: (i) Jesus sends the apostles to the end of the earth ~ Apollo sends Dio on mission to the end of the earth; (ii) both texts instantiate these journeyings; (iii) in both, the end of the earth/text/ultimate missionary location turns out to be Rome (whether in *Acts* literally the end of the earth, as in ps.-Sol. 8.15, or – better – proleptically so). *Could* Dio have known Luke, *Acts* (certainly the earlier text and often conjectured to be Rome-oriented)?

¹⁴¹ The combination of horizontal (Dio's wanderings) and vertical (ascent to the 'heights' of virtue) and the relationship between the two (the former precursor of the latter) is paralleled in the *First Kingship* (1.66ff.).

¹⁴² A referee notes that Delphi also claimed to be the centre of the world, which presumably increases the piquancy of Dio's topographical playing.

¹⁴³ 1.49, 55, etc.; 12.1, 16; 30.1, 46; 36. 43; Moles (1990) 322; (1995b) 181, 188; (2000a) 197-8.

¹⁴⁴ Because of the Platonic evocations (Moles (1990) 320; Trapp (1990) 143-4) and the obviously *post eventum* prophecy.

¹⁴⁵ Parke and Wormell (1956) 409; Fontenrose (1978) 15 n.4; 263; Moles (1978) 99; Desideri (1991) 3938-9.

recalled, it might ... seem that this oracle was made up after the event.’¹⁴⁶ Moreover, ‘the end(s) of the earth’ is an exilic *topos*; Delphi told the Athenians in 481/80 to flee to the ends of the earth¹⁴⁷ (hence Dio’s *Athenian* audience might be tickled by such an invention); and the phrase plays a crucial role in *Or.* 13’s spatial and moral architecture.

Yet such invention might, even for Dio, be an invention too far. The ‘coincidence’ of Dio’s being ‘at the end of the earth’ when recalled is only excessive if the oracle’s response (9 ‘he told me to keep doing the very thing on which I was¹⁴⁸ engaged with all enthusiasm, as being a fine and useful activity, “until,” he said, “you come to the end of the earth”’) was to the question ‘when will my exile end?’¹⁴⁹ Dio omits the question, but it is better understood as ‘what should I do in my exile?’ He then found the response ‘out of place’ and ‘not easy to put together’, because it was not easy to see how wandering was a fine and useful activity, nor to locate ‘the end of the earth’, nor to understand how attaining it was a solution to his problems. More positively, Delphi provides the ultimate divine and philosophical grounding for the speech, and it *would* be weakening, if that grounding were entirely groundless, especially, perhaps, given the very public association with Delphi of Plutarch and the rivalry between these two great Greeks.¹⁵⁰ Rather, when the sentence of exile was passed, Dio *immediately* began wandering,¹⁵¹ and his inventiveness comes into play, not with the consultation itself nor with the oracular response (oracles, too, use τόποι),¹⁵² but with the many philosophical associations that he thereby invokes and with the paradoxical twist that he gives to ‘the end of the earth’, using Apollo’s instruction as the basis for a rewriting of his whole career, a rewriting which has the practical advantage of suppressing his pre-exile philosophizing and related aspects of his disreputable past, but which, more importantly, gives divine sanction to his post-exile dealings with Nerva and Trajan and to his project of the conversion of Rome.

As to why Dio consulted Delphi, he may have been influenced by the motives that he adduces (8), commonplace though they are,¹⁵³ and, as a Stoic (mostly), he should have accepted oracles,¹⁵⁴ but he must already have been conscious of the philosophical associations of his action, must already have been stage-managing the drama of *Dio Socraticus et Cynicus*.

INTERPRETATION

There is much to consider: the speech’s wit, irony and literary sophistication; its moral seriousness; its philosophical content; its view of *paideia*; Dio’s own dramatic role; the representations of fifth-century Athenians, of contemporary Greeks other than the Athenians (11-15), and of the Romans; the apparently dominant focus on Rome at the end; the teaching that Dio gives the Romans; the relationship between internal audiences (especially the Romans) and external audience (Athenians).

I start with the last.

¹⁴⁶ Jones (1978) 47 (quotation), 51, 176 n.57.

¹⁴⁷ Hdt. 7.140 (which perhaps influenced Dio in another respect: n.120), and e.g. *Ov. Tr.* 1.2.85, 2.195, 3.3.3; *Sen. Ep.* 28.4.

¹⁴⁸ ‘I am engaged’ (Cohon) could only be justified were Dio saying: ‘to do the very thing on which I am [now] engaged’ (post-96 Dio could still represent himself as wandering: 12.16ff.); but ‘the very thing’ implies ‘more of the same’, an implication reinforced by the Odyssean analogy; *πρόρτείν* means ‘to keep doing’ (thus also Cohoon); the present εἶμι is ‘vivid’.

¹⁴⁹ As Fontenrose (1978) 15 n.4.

¹⁵⁰ *Lamprias Catalogue* 204, 227; Desideri (1978) 4-5.

¹⁵¹ Had Dio *settled* elsewhere, he would have lost his Bithynian properties: von Arnim (1898) 235-6.

¹⁵² Fontenrose (1978) 166ff.; Hammerstaedt (1993) 405.

¹⁵³ Verrengia (2000) 87-8, 136.

¹⁵⁴ Contrast his more Cynic voice in 1.56 and 10.17ff.

Greeks and Romans

On one level, Dio and his audience are Greeks and the Romans are Romans (despite Dio's own Roman citizenship and high imperial connections and the certainty of there being Roman citizens in Dio's audience). Dio consults Delphi 'in accordance with the ancient custom of the Greeks' (9), addresses the Romans as 'you' and talks of 'your city', alludes to the Roman empire as something external to himself (34ff.),¹⁵⁵ and distinguishes straightforwardly between Greeks, Romans, Scythians and Indians (32). The latter half of the speech focuses on Roman vices, and the ending leaves the Romans entirely without *paideia* in the normal sense, their 'learning' confined to the military arts, not themselves commended,¹⁵⁶ while the Greeks seem to belong to the 'ruled' (33), which, given the 'succession-of-empires' motif (23-5, 34), effectively makes them the Romans' 'slaves'.

Is Dio, then, merely trying to convince his Athenian audience that he said appropriately critical and admonitory things to the Romans, thereby deflecting the charge that he was a mere flatterer of the Greeks' imperial masters?¹⁵⁷ True, self-justification is rarely absent from Dio's works; *Or.* 13 is at least self-justifying in its treatments of his relationship with Sabinus and of his philosophical career;¹⁵⁸ and Dio often had to deflect this charge.¹⁵⁹ But this reading leaves large tracts of the speech unexplained.

Might one, then, broaden the reading out and suggest that *Or.* 13 promotes Greek intellectual and philosophical identity as a bulwark against Roman power, at its most brutal under the Domitianic tyranny (1) but corrupted generally by materialism and luxury (31-7)? This reading *seems* to swab up a great deal of the speech, and one might compare Dio's *Olympicus*, a celebration of Greek religious culture that represents the Romans as militarists and the Greeks as their slaves.¹⁶⁰

Superficially, there is much that appears to be intended to compliment the Athenians on their *paideia*. There are literary allusions a-plenty, nice literary turns, much skilful interweaving of different philosophical strands, and juicy interpretative challenges. There might also seem to be an appeal to Athenians' sense of moral superiority, as they listen to Dio's attacks on Roman decadence;¹⁶¹ amusing disparagement of Rome as 'the end of the earth'; and consolation in the thoughts that Roman power, apparently so strong, is fragile¹⁶² and that the philosophical 'solution' is Greek.¹⁶³

Yet any 'anti-Roman' reading fails in the face of the simple fact that the portrayal of the Romans is not finally negative. When Dio alludes to the Roman empire as something external to himself, he is appealing to the Romans' self-interest; the characterization of the Romans as 'learned' in military matters (only) is made to the Romans themselves as well as to the Athenians and has protreptic force; and the fact that Dio ends up as philosophical 'ambassador' of Nerva and Trajan to the Romans and propounds a substantial philosophical programme indicates moral concern for them. Thus, in so far as the Romans are represented as different from the Greeks,

¹⁵⁵ Contrast 3.34, 50; 41.9 (see n.213) and 79.5.

¹⁵⁶ 37 ~ 32 ~ 24 (the Persians); also (?) ~ Virg. *Aen.* 6.847ff. (n.59).

¹⁵⁷ Swain (1996) 213.

¹⁵⁸ Pp. 120 and 121.

¹⁵⁹ E.g. 3.12-25; *Or.* 57.

¹⁶⁰ Moles (1995b) 183-4; Swain (1996) 200-3; Klaucke and Bäbler (2000) 158-9; *pace* Billaut (1999) 218-19; Greeks slaves of Rome: 31.125; 34.39, 51; Moles (1995b) 178 n.5; Veyne (1999); *pace* Salmeri (2000) 86; Roman militarism: also 30.35 with Moles (2000a) 209.

¹⁶¹ Thus, e.g., Fuchs (1938) 18 n.65; Jones (1978) 129 and 195 n.26, comparing Lucian's *Nigrinus*, also set in Athens and seemingly critical of Roman morals; *contra* Desideri (1978) 253-4 n.10; sophisticated analysis in Whitmarsh (2001) 265-79 (though I do not agree that *Nigrinus* offers *no moral locus*).

¹⁶² 34 'but as for now [Rome's] greatness arouses suspicion and is *not at all* secure': thus rightly Swain (1996) 212, *pace* Cohoon and Verrengia; *cf.* Dio's brilliant reworking (36) of *Il.* 23.161-77.

¹⁶³ *Cf.* the *Olympicus*, in which 'it is Greek poets, artists, and philosophers ... who have most perfectly represented the divine, and ... contemporary Greece is suffering from Roman misrule' (Moles (1995b) 184).

they are, paradoxically, both uneducated and easily educable, and the latter not only because of the intrinsic ‘easiness’ of the Antisthenic/Cynic education, but because the Romans’ military expertise has already demonstrated their capacity for learning and because there is some analogy between Roman *virtus* and Cynic virtue. The practicability of that virtue is further facilitated by the transition from Domitianic to Nerva and Trajanic Rome.¹⁶⁴

Moreover, the *content* of Dio’s teaching of the Romans is important. Despite modern scepticism,¹⁶⁵ his claim (29ff.) to have publicly exhorted the Romans to virtue is confirmed by *Or.* 79,¹⁶⁶ which attacks the city’s materialism and argues that she will follow previous empires into oblivion, if she does not reform (cf. *Or.* 13); by *Or.* 72,¹⁶⁷ which wryly notes the unpopularity of philosophers’ preachiness (9); and by the *Euboicus* (*Or.* 7), which tackles the question of suitable work for the urban poor, which was delivered, among other places, in Rome, and which, like *Or.* 13, has a certain Cynic underpinning.¹⁶⁸ Further, *Or.* 13 alludes to Dio’s philosophical relationships with Nerva and Trajan, and it has repeated conceptual parallels with the *First Kingship*.¹⁶⁹ Thus *Orations* 1-4 (the *Kingships*), 7, 13, and 79 (and, in lighter vein, 72) all contribute to a post-exilic project for the moral reform of Rome, with the *Kingships* focusing on the new emperor, the others on the Romans *en masse*.

This suggests another context for *Or.* 13. Although most of Dio’s works are speeches for oral delivery and many are occasional, some of the occasional pieces were recycled for other contexts;¹⁷⁰ Dio emphasizes the paideutic value of reading; and some of his works are (also) reading works.¹⁷¹ Hence, besides the primary audiences of speeches delivered in Rome and Athens, Dio may also have envisaged a ‘reading audience’,¹⁷² which could contextualize *Oration* 13 alongside *Orations* 1-4, 7 and 79 and construct intertextual relationships. Certainly, such readings ‘work’. One might hold that *Or.* 13’s subtleties make private reading the ‘ideal’ reception context anyway. The moral teaching of 29ff. could have been directly available to Romans, as well as to Athenians and other Greeks.

But, if on any view Dio’s moral teaching of the Romans is substantial, he is also saying profoundly uncomfortable things to his primary audience. Any cosy feelings of Greek superiority (cultural or other) are undermined on a number of levels. Athenian military successes of the fifth and early fourth centuries BC are summarily dismissed by Socrates (25-6)¹⁷³ – and the emphasis matters, because of the parallel dismissal by Dio of Roman power (32, 34). Greeks who yearned for the glory days¹⁷⁴ are granted no indulgence. Even more challengingly dismissed are the main constituents of traditional Athenian (and general Greek) *paideia*: music, athletics, the highest literary achievements. This dismissal cannot be sanitized as ‘inert’ repetition of ‘historical’ philosophical positions: in the Second Sophistic era, when Greece was, from one perspective, under Roman rule (as this speech stresses), these were things that the Greek élite vigorously celebrated.

Dio in fact uses various devices to suggest the collapsing of time between Socrates and himself. One is to imply parallels between then and now (the triviality and impermanence of

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Tac. *Agr.* 3.1, etc.

¹⁶⁵ Swain (1996) 213; Whitmarsh (2001) 164, 215.

¹⁶⁶ Schmid (1903) 857; Moles (1983c) 130-1; *contra* Sheppard (1982) (exilic delivery in Tarsus) and Desideri (1978) 232-4 (exilic).

¹⁶⁷ Von Arnim (1898) 276 (add 72.13-16 ~ 12.6-8); Crosby (1951) 174-5; Russell (1992) 166; Desideri’s exilic dating ((1978) 235; 259 n.68) is untenable.

¹⁶⁸ Moles (1995b) 177-9 (naturally not the *only* philosophical underpinning).

¹⁶⁹ N.11.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. 3.12; 4.73; *Or.* 5; *Or.* 7 (with Moles (1995b) 177); 11.6; *Or.* 57.

¹⁷¹ *Or.* 18 is a reading-list for a politician and *Or.* 2 a reading-list for Trajan: Moles (1990) 346; *Or.* 3.3 approves Trajan’s reading of ‘the ancients’ (including Dio’s own *Kingships*); and *Or.* 52 starts from Dio’s reading of tragedy.

¹⁷² Intriguingly, Whitmarsh (2001) 162: ‘the sophisticated reader’. Note also 15, where Dio’s playful Thucydidean stress on the difficulty of recalling Socrates’ λόγος gains piquancy from his own reliance on a written text.

¹⁷³ Similar in tone to *Charidemus* 30.35, with Moles (2000a) 209.

¹⁷⁴ Bowie (1970); (1974); Plut. *Praec. pol.* 814a-c.

fifth-century Athenian military successes ~ the triviality and impermanence of current Roman military supremacy). Another is simply to dissolve the distinction between ‘then’ and ‘now’ into a universalizing ‘always’, hence Dio’s own swift aside within Socrates’ speech (26): ‘and this has come not only to the Athenians but also to practically all human beings, both previously and now’.¹⁷⁵ Another is to suggest a distinction between education which is merely old and education whose oldness has genuinely validating force. Thus Socrates, as reported by Dio, satirically instances the ability to play Lamprocles on the lyre as proof for his Athenian audience of their political competence and defeat of the Persians as proof of the superiority of Athenian education (19; 23). These arguments were used by Right, to champion what to him was ‘the old education’ (Ar. *Nub.* 967, 985-6). But to *his* Athenian audience Dio projects *Socrates* as representative of ‘the old *logos*’ (14, 29) – a representation itself supported by the link between Socrates and Delphi (30) and the latter’s association with ‘the ancient custom of the Greeks’ (9). Hence the standards of ‘ancient Socrates’ deconstruct the ‘ancient’ *paideia* both of Socrates’ contemporary audience and of Dio’s.

Thus Dio’s Athenian listeners are given every incentive to see that Dio’s account of Socrates’ haranguings of fifth-century Athenians is a text that applies to them too, and that they are also in the same boat as the morally uninstructed Greeks whom Dio addressed during his wanderings (11-15): they must not take the fact that Dio is saying ‘things which happen to have been said many years before’ as an excuse for ‘applying their minds the less’ (15).

Hence the apparently dominant, and apparently problematic, focus on Rome at the end is on one level deceptive: the speech has quite as much to say to, and about, the external, contemporary Athenians. While it seems that the speech finally ‘homes in’ on Rome, this is not because Rome is its final concern, but rather because the physical place of Rome as it now is provides the best context for the promotion of the moral reform of *both* Romans *and* Athenians, both of whom are invited to *redefine* their moral place/space. For, if temporal boundaries are dissolved, so also are spatial (*cf.* 26).

Indeed, by the very end (37), the needs of both Roman and Athenian audiences paradoxically converge. The Athenians have lost their military power forever. Their vaunted *paideia* did not produce that evanescent military power, nor should it be a source of pride to them now in their subordination to Rome. The Romans never had any *paideia* in the Greek sense but had military *paideia* and still have empire, but that empire is fragile. Despite their apparent differences of status, then, the solution for both audiences is precisely the same: moral regeneration through Cynic *paideia* or ‘self-sufficiency’, though it is a solution to two rather different problems – for the Romans, the problem of materialism and luxury, for the Athenians, that of devotion to a culture which contributes nothing to moral virtue.¹⁷⁶

Strikingly, in a speech addressed to cultured Athenians, the (alleged) fact that the Romans have no conventional culture has no moral significance and their military superiority proves their suitability for Cynic *paideia*. Here, as elsewhere, notably in *Or.* 18, the *Borystheniticus* and the *Kingships*,¹⁷⁷ the highly *πεπαιδευμένος* Dio shows admirable flexibility in varying the dose of conventional *paideia* to suit particular moral needs. And as in the *Charidemus* and *Borystheniticus*,¹⁷⁸ Dio disconcertingly plays internal and external audiences off against each other.

This paradoxical convergence of need is pointed by structural patterning: just as Socrates ended his appeal to the Athenians by engaging with their national myth (the *epitaphios*), so Dio ends his appeal to the Romans by engaging with theirs (Romans do power, not culture); and the

¹⁷⁵ Clearly Dio’s own intervention: Desideri (1978) 221.

¹⁷⁶ Of course, attacks on Roman luxury must also impact on wealthy Athenians.

¹⁷⁷ Moles (1995b) 185.

¹⁷⁸ Russell (1992) 23; Moles (1995b) 184-92; Nesselrath, Bäbler, Forschner and de Jong (2003) appear uninterested in these interpretative aspects of the *Borystheniticus*.

Romans' moral problems, to which the Cynic educational programme is a solution (37), are climactically characterized as a form of 'unchastened licentiousness', just as Dio himself began the slow process of his own Cynic education by 'chastening himself' (10). And if Dio is the σύμβουλος of everybody he meets in the speech, he is necessarily also – because of the interplay between internal audiences and external audience – the σύμβουλος of the Athenians.

This explains another level of the speech. Analysis so far has proceeded on the basis of Greeks and Romans being different, but this difference is sometimes ignored. Dio's allusions to 'the man who was not base' and to 'those who were then fortunate and ruling' (1) do not imply: 'they were Romans, we are not'. Similarly, the Scythian analogy (1) suggests Dio's membership of the same race/nation as everyone else (that is, as members of the Roman empire), and Dio's role as philosophical agent of Nerva and Trajan stresses his closeness to (good) Roman emperors, not his separateness from Rome. For ultimately in this speech, as in two other of his greatest works, the *Olympicus* and the *Borystheniticus*, Dio's moral concern is with nothing less than the whole world, because essentially the same moral prescription fits all human beings, though with necessary adjustments for local circumstances.¹⁷⁹ The Dio of these texts plays off the differences between Greek and Roman, but then subordinates them to the construction of virtue. Through Dio's 'redefinition' of 'Romanness', as implicit in the claim that, if the Romans follow his moral programme, they will become 'stronger' (34), the Athenians are also invited to become 'more roman', but this does not at all mean that they should become more Roman. For both groups, the apparent redefinition of 'ethnicity' functions as an encouragement to the acquisition of virtue. True, that virtue is conceived and exemplified by Greeks (Delphi, Socrates, Plato, Antisthenes, Dio), but it is not distinctively Greek: very few Greeks have it; Scythians and Indians might have it, and in the Cynic tradition, to which *Or.* 13 broadly belongs, some of them did have it; even Romans might have it; and it is open to everyone. In these respects, *Or.* 13 issues a profound challenge to Greeks' self-consciousness as Greeks, not because the constitution of Greekness is problematic, but because Greekness is not synonymous with virtue.¹⁸⁰

Philosophical simplicity

The speech issues an even more uncomfortable challenge to that most characteristic prejudice of sophisticated intellectuals (Greek and Roman, ancient and modern): that the more complex a philosophy, the better it is. But, for all its philosophical allusions, *Or.* 13's moral teaching is essentially simple, as Dio insists,¹⁸¹ and it culminates in the exposition, directly to the Romans, implicitly to the Athenians, of a modified version of Antisthenes' 'double education', which is *explicitly* 'easy'. That the physical end of the speech which articulates that doctrine is also the end of the speech (in the sense of its ultimate meaning) is conveyed by numerous factors: the cumulative sense that Dio's 'wanderings' point towards 'the truth'; the status of Rome as the Apollo-inspired final destination of those wanderings; the status of the text itself as a journey; the sense of Dio as Nerva and Trajan's 'ambassador' to the Romans and as the ultimate σύμβουλος of the speech; and the sense that the Antisthenic 'double education' is the answer to the speech's quest for true education.

¹⁷⁹ Here the *Charidemus* is different: Moles (2000a) 209.

¹⁸⁰ Hence another parallel with the subtly destabilizing *Borystheniticus*: Russell (1992) 23; Moles (1995b) 190-2. Whitmarsh's claims ((2001) 20, 31) that "Greek" and "Roman" ... [are] constructed self-positions, idealized reifications rather than self-evident subjectivities' and that 'identity is not expressed through but constituted by social discourse' seem to me overwrought: Dio is

interested in the 'construction' of *virtue*; he takes 'Romanness' and 'Greekness' (and 'Indianness' and 'Scythianness') as *givens*. Nor is his double typology – Greeks and Romans different, Greeks and Romans the same (as fellow members of the Roman empire) – problematic. Of course, one can decide which to emphasize in a given context, but that is not 'construction'.

¹⁸¹ P. 123.

Irony

How, then, does Dio's elaborate irony play within this ultimately simple moral scenario? Irony's many effects undoubtedly include complicit pleasure between sophisticated audiences/readers and sophisticated speakers/writers. 'For a sophisticated reader, the thirteenth oration's conspicuous focus upon [Dio's] ... random discovery of philosophy must be offset against his knowing evocation of a deeply established narrative paradigm.'¹⁸² But there is also *philosophical* irony, both Socratic and Cynic.

A main function of such irony is to challenge audiences' ability to discern underlying seriousness. Dio's 'random discovery of philosophy' is not *finally* random: *apparent* chance is *divine* chance.¹⁸³ The 'modesty' of his disclaimer of the title of philosopher is short-lived: such terminology was avoided by Socrates himself (28). A more involved example is Dio's characterization both of Socrates' *logos* and of himself as 'old' (14/29).¹⁸⁴ There is much irony: the allusion to 'a certain Socrates' (14),¹⁸⁵ the characterization of Socratic doctrine as 'old' and 'stale' (29), the very notion (especially in this highly sophisticated speech) of Dio himself as old-fashioned and unlearned. Still, it is 'not hard' to see that the 'old' (ἀρχαῖος) *logos* of 'old' Socrates and 'old' Dio (who in 101 was even literally 'old' and looked it)¹⁸⁶ *unites* such *apparently* varied themes as the superiority of old wisdom to new; the inversion of beginning and end; the associations between ancient wisdom, beginnings, endings and ruling (ἀρχή), and ruling as self-rule, ruling others, and having good or bad rulers;¹⁸⁷ the association between *all* these things and 'good' and 'bad' fortune and 'good' and 'bad' 'chance';¹⁸⁸ and the idea that Dio himself is the mediator between past and present and between Greek and Roman and the instantiation of the 'old', 'beginning', 'ruling' *logos* which potentially solves all moral problems. Dio constructs a similar overriding architectural and thematic role for himself in other speeches, notably in the *First* and *Fourth Kingships*, *Euboicus*, *Olympicus*, *Borystheniticus* and *Charidemus*.¹⁸⁹

The move from formally depreciatory to positively assertive is underscored by several factors. The characterization 'old and stale' (29) is elegantly 'pre-cut' by 15:

I requested them ... not to pay any the less attention just because I was saying the things which happened to have been said many years before, 'For,' I asserted, 'perhaps you will be helped most in this way. For it is not at all likely that the words of old have evaporated like drugs and lost their power.'

The apparent equivocations about Socrates' *logos* are supplanted by the statements (30) that he was admired by all the Greeks for his wisdom and esteemed wisest by Apollo. The always implausible picture of Dio as an unoriginal and reluctant(!) performer (29) is undermined by the allusions to his relations with Nerva and Trajan (analogous to Socrates' with Archelaus) and to the Delphic oracle (another ring-structure), which reinforce the parallels between Socrates and Dio and the validation of 'ancient wisdom'. Existing admirers of Dio (who certainly got the invitations) will already know that appeal to such wisdom is one of his commonest moves.¹⁹⁰

So much for irony as challenge to audiences' discernment of underlying seriousness.

¹⁸² Whitmarsh (2001) 162-3.

¹⁸³ N.188; the same play in the *First Kingship*: 1.9, 52 'I chanced to find the right road', etc.; Moles (1990) 320, 323.

¹⁸⁴ Quoted on pp. 119-20.

¹⁸⁵ Whitmarsh (2001) 163.

¹⁸⁶ The *First Kingship* similarly uses Dio's 'oldness' as visual validation: 1.53, 75 with Moles (1990) 321, 328; cf. also p. 135.

¹⁸⁷ 1 ἀρχόντων, 6 ἀρχήν, 14 λόγον ἀρχαῖον, 29 ἀρχαῖα ... ἀρχαιότητα, 30 Ἀρχέλαος, 33 ἄρχοντες ... αὐτῶν ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, 34 ἡ πόλις ...

ἄρχουσα. This extended punning on ἀρχή-roots (whether inspired by Thucydides (1.1.1, 23.4-6), Herodotus (1.5.1, 3) or Hesiod (*Theog.* 1, 36)) is paralleled in the *Charidemus*: Moles (2000a) 206-7.

¹⁸⁸ 1 εὐδαιμόνων τε καὶ ἀρχόντων, 2 δυστυχές, 3 τοῦ δαιμονίου, 11 ἐντυγχάνοντες, 12 τυχόν, 20 ἀτυχήματα ... δυστυχεστάτω, 24 κακοδαιμόνος, δαίμωνων, 31 εὐδαιμόνες, 33 εὐδαιμόνες ... καὶ ἄρχοντες.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Moles (1990) 309, 314, 316, 319, 323-5, 328-33, 336, 349; (1995b) 180-1, 183-92; (2000a) 202-9.

¹⁹⁰ N.85.

Other functions of philosophical irony are more rhetorical. Ironic self-deprecation helps to soften otherwise uncompromising moral prescriptions.¹⁹¹ Dio is adept at this technique. When disclaiming the title of ‘philosopher’ (11-12), he contrasts himself with ‘the majority of the so-called philosophers [who] proclaim themselves such, just as do heralds at Olympia’ – and not only with heralds, but also with Dio himself in the recent past.¹⁹² Again, the protracted narrative (21) of the Greeks’ stoning of Palamedes after he had taught them literacy and the rudiments of military and regal skills has conflicting implications, but one of these is to recall *Socrates*’ fate after his *unsuccessful* attempt to educate the Athenians and slyly to suggest: ‘don’t shoot the messenger on this occasion’.¹⁹³ This ‘softening’ effect is also secured by the rumbustious and typically Cynic combination of comic exaggeration, self-depreciation and self-assertion¹⁹⁴ illustrated by Dio’s elaborate proposal (32-3) that the Romans should find true philosophical teachers and instal him (Dio shifts neatly from plural to singular) on ‘the Acropolis’, issuing an edict for all the young men and even the older men to associate with him and learn wisdom from him. This proposal, a sort of rhetorical blow-up both of *Socrates*’ claim to free maintenance by the city¹⁹⁵ and of edicts honouring philosophers for associating with the young, makes Dio himself both obviously *not* such a man and – equally obviously – *exactly* such a man (at 34 Dio even assumes the man’s voice).¹⁹⁶ And the proposal itself, like its Socratic original, is both comically exaggerated and serious.

Paideia

If Dio’s supple and flexible irony does not threaten the simplicity of his moral teaching but on the contrary emphasizes it, what of the speech’s literary sophistication?

Of course, that literary sophistication, too, is to some extent pleasurable in its own right. Not only, however, do the literary allusions become progressively more sparing,¹⁹⁷ but there is a gathering sense of literature’s inadequacy as a moral guide. Exiled from his glittering Roman world, Dio turns to epic and tragedy, Classical Greece’s highest literary forms, but they counsel only despair (4-6). Later, Dio notes that ‘no one has propounded a tragedy about anyone simply because he is poor’ (20), pointedly underlining tragedy’s incapacity as a vehicle for the Cynic philosophical solution propounded by the speech itself. Better the ‘tragic performance’ of *Socrates* (14) – or the tragic *metabasis* of Dio, returned from exile to Rome but as a chastened Cynic. Dio’s is the ‘true’, Cynic, tragedy – the one that works, both for himself and as a paradigm for others.¹⁹⁸ Not conventional *paideia*, then, but the *paideia* of Cynicism, which rejects conventional *paideia* and replaces it with a simple *moral* programme. If, at the beginning, the apparent simplicity of the speech is (on one level) deconstructed by its literary sophistication and complexity, by the end (metaphorically, literally and literarily), that complexity itself is unwinding.

It is of course an acute paradox that a speech that rejects conventional *paideia* should itself contain such *paideia* and in such large quantities. But such paradox is not ‘play’ for its own sake.

Cynic rhetoric is again relevant. Paradox itself challenges audiences to think about essentials.¹⁹⁹ Cynics’ use of sophisticated philosophical devices (for example, *Diogenes*’ *Politeia* and syllogisms)²⁰⁰ preempts intellectual contempt for the simplicity of Cynic moral teaching. His learned and deft mobilization of different philosophical sources should prevent patronizing disparage-

¹⁹¹ Cf., e.g., *Demetr. Eloc.* 261; *Diog. Laert.* 6.38 (*Diogenes*’ self-description); *Epict.* 3.22.90; *Dio* 72.13.

¹⁹² 12.12, 27-8, 47-8 (also 70.8), with Moles (1995b) 182 and n.21; I adhere to 97 as the *Olympicus*’ date (also Sheppard (1984) 159); 101 (Jones (1978) 53, 176 n.69) might also allow *Olympicus*’ priority; only 105 (far too late, I believe) would exclude it.

¹⁹³ The *Palamedes* being one of *Gorgias*’ most celebrated works, 21 also conveys anti-sophistic polemic.

¹⁹⁴ Cf., e.g., *Diog. Laert.* 6.35, 38.

¹⁹⁵ *Pl. Ap.* 36d.

¹⁹⁶ On this clever passage cf. also n.133.

¹⁹⁷ Illustrative material in nn.19-24.

¹⁹⁸ Thus the implicit ‘tragedy of *Diogenes*’, archetypal poor philosopher (2-5; n.21), is proleptic of the ‘correct tragic solution’.

¹⁹⁹ Discussion in Moles (1993) 259-62; (1996) 105-7.

²⁰⁰ Moles (1995a) 129-43 and (2000b) 423-32.

ment of Dio-*philosophus*.²⁰¹ Again, for all Cynicism's intellectual simplicity, leading representatives such as Diogenes and Crates were sharply intelligent. Dio's own sharpness comes through in unorthodox insights such as that the Peloponnesian War was won not by the Spartans but by the Persians²⁰² and that, even at its apparent height, the Roman Empire was enviously hated and fragile²⁰³ (contrast the usual fatuities about Rome the Civilizer and *Roma aeterna*). Confronted with Cynics at their formidable best, audiences encounter the unsettling phenomenon of clever people who say simple things in clever ways. True, the commonest Cynic mode is one of direct attack and direct moral exhortation and this mode, too, is abundantly illustrated in *Or.* 13. But direct attack becomes wearisome without the leavening of entertainment, whence Cynic σπουδαιογέλοιοι.²⁰⁴

More fundamentally, however, the very argument of the speech requires the presence of such *paideia*. Dio's Athenian audience needs to have the moral inefficacy of its sophisticated education systematically demonstrated to it, hence the massive presence of that education and its progressive retreat, and the blithe concluding implication that the Romans' complete lack of such education has no moral significance whatsoever.

PERFORMANCE CONTEXT AND MORAL DEMAND

Ever since Philostratus and Synesius,²⁰⁵ critical discussion both of Dio's varied corpus and of his ambiguous career has revolved around the debate whether he should be classified as a philosopher or as a sophist, with such concomitant polarities as 'serious/playful', 'weighty/trivial' and 'sincere/insincere'. The post-exile Dio wrote some sophistic works and sometimes performed as a sophist and had pupils who became sophists.²⁰⁶ He also wrote unequivocally philosophical works. And some of his works actively resist such pigeonholing.²⁰⁷ 'Sophistic' is part of 'performance culture', but 'philosophy' can be too. Cynics were necessarily public performers,²⁰⁸ though some also wrote. Dio himself was one of the biggest public performers of his age. But it is also a philosophical technique (going back to Socrates and Plato) to 'out-sophist sophists' as a preliminary, or adjunct, to the proper business of philosophizing, or as a *reductio ad absurdum*.²⁰⁹ Of course, the polarities 'philosopher/sophist', 'serious/playful', etc. are too sharp, particularly as applied to this period of Greek literature. Nevertheless, it may still be worth establishing the dominant propensity of a particular work, because that propensity may itself be part of the meaning of the work (and of other similar works, though not necessarily of the *oeuvre*). Where, then, within these competing but overlapping landscapes, should we locate *Or.* 13, performed in Athens (though arguably also a reading text)? Does it belong within 'the highly charged, highly agonistic space of sophistic performance' and demonstrate that 'literature can be sophisticated, ludic, self-ironizing, and/or irresponsible' and that 'literary texts do not provide a clear window into the souls of their authors'?²¹⁰

Dio's 'sincerity' does not ultimately matter, although in one respect he is being *insincere*,²¹¹ and wedges between texts and authors can be excessively great (it would, for example, be highly counter-intuitive to deny that Dio had a colossal ego, apparent throughout *Or.* 13). But it is the text that counts, and between the polarity of 'ludic' and 'sincere' lies the crucial *tertium*

²⁰¹ From this perspective, the classic Brunt (1973) reads rather datedly now.

²⁰² Cf. Olmstead (1948) 371: 'Persia had won the second great war with the European Greeks.'

²⁰³ Starr (1982) 3: 'the Roman Empire ... was an impossibility'.

²⁰⁴ Kindstrand (1976) 47-8; *spoudaiogeloion* in Dio: *Or.* 72.13 (important); Moles (1983a) 274-5; Saïd (2000) 171, 180.

²⁰⁵ Philostr. *VS* 487-8; Synes. *Dion*.

²⁰⁶ Moles (1978).

²⁰⁷ Cf. Saïd (2000) 180 on the *Troicus*: 'there is no reason to think that these readings are mutually exclusive ... In a way this is "play", but really "serious play".'

²⁰⁸ Branham (1996).

²⁰⁹ E.g. Dio 4.79-81; Moles (1978) 81; Saïd (2000) 171; Schofield (2000) 198-9.

²¹⁰ Whitmarsh (2001) 215.

²¹¹ P. 121.

quid of ‘serious’. This speech makes an *argument*, and, while that argument is ultimately simple, it is also *serious*, because practically *everything* in the speech contributes to it. *Or.* 13’s ‘ludic’ qualities positively reinforce its moral teaching, which is both overtly philosophical (once we discount Dio’s tissue-thin equivocations) and implicitly anti-sophistic.²¹² Nor are there ‘contradictions’ with other Dionian speeches explicable only in terms of ‘the highly charged, highly agonistic space of sophistic performance’.²¹³ Rather, the speech takes its place in a series concerned with the Romans’ moral status, though it simultaneously targets the Athenians. And it is actually its performance context (whether that in Athens or that which we as readers have to reconstruct) that provides the last proof of its radically philosophical claims.

Dio says that, as part of his ‘self-chastening’ in response to the Delphic oracle, he donned ‘humble dress’ (10 στολήν ... ταπεινήν). In context, this dress is Cynic and Dio’s donning of it symbolises proleptically his conversion to Cynicism.²¹⁴ Such Cynic dress is as ‘undressy’ as may be (short of ‘Gymnosophy’ or ‘Cynogamy’). When the Cynicized Socrates appears, he is described as shouting ‘altogether manlily and un-dressed-up-ly’ ((16) ἀνυποστόλως). Dress now becomes a metaphor for style or type of performance,²¹⁵ and the contrast is between the simplest and the most elaborate types of dress, the latter of which conceals.²¹⁶ Both Socrates and the dramatic Dio of 10ff. are ‘undressy’ Cynic performers,²¹⁷ and there is the further implication that style and moral content must match. Nothing suggests that the dramatic Dio changed dress when he reached Rome (29ff.), and *Or.* 72 confirms that he at least sometimes ‘dressed Cynic’ when performing as a philosopher in Rome, as elsewhere.²¹⁸ Dio’s self-representation in this speech would fail if he were wearing something different before his Athenian audience. Hence, just as Dio’s ‘oldness’ (metaphorical and literal) instantiates and validates the speech’s ‘old *logos*’, so also his Cynic dress instantiates and privileges the Cynic narrative and moral voice (which is only another form of ‘the old *logos*’). Style, content, man and appearance are one.²¹⁹ Although the speech itself is ‘dressed up’ in all sorts of sophisticated ways, in order to interpret it rightly we have, as it were, to ‘undress’ it to its Cynic ‘underwear’, itself of course a fittingly Cynic act, at least potentially.

But ‘potentially’ is itself another point. *Or.* 13 is a protreptic: its ultimate success or failure does not lie with Dio the speaker/writer, or with his audience’s/readers’ ability to decode his meanings, but rather with whether, inspired by Dio’s rhetoric, impressive as it is, and following Dio’s practical example, which has at least some moral substance, they accept their own moral responsibility and begin the process of enacting those meanings in their own lives. Hence the explicitly forward-looking exhortations to the Romans (35, 37) and the implicitly forward-looking exhortations to the Athenians and any other audiences/readers, all of whom are invited to ‘write a better moral story’ in the future than the dismal stories of their respective pasts and presents.²²⁰

²¹² N.193.

²¹³ Whitmarsh (2001) 215-16 takes the ‘contradiction’ between Dio’s ‘anti-Roman’ attack on Roman decadence in *Or.* 13 and his apparent ‘pro-Roman’ pride in his Roman citizenship in 41.6 as deriving from ‘shifts in rhetorical self-presentation ... [between the roles of] oppositionalist (the pose he adopts in his writings on exile) or ... adviser (the pose he adopts in the *Kingships*)’. But: (i) Dio’s attack on Roman decadence in *Or.* 13 is not ‘anti-Roman’; (ii) *Or.* 41 is a *political* speech delivered to a Roman colony; (iii) in *Or.* 13 Dio *begins* as ‘oppositionalist’ but *ends* as ‘adviser’ (both of Romans and Athenians). Here ‘sophistic’ is being made to explain too much.

²¹⁴ This conversion motif: Kindstrand (1976) 163-4; the old debate whether/to what extent Dio ‘really’ became Cynic does not matter here: the *representation* is *serious in context*.

²¹⁵ Douglas (1966) 201; Fantham (1972) 171-2 (I thank Jaap Wisse for advice).

²¹⁶ LSJ *s.v.*

²¹⁷ The *First Kingship* also plays with μῦθος ~ ‘dress’: 1.49, with Moles (1990) 319; Whitmarsh (2001) 197; and the Arcadian prophetess’ ‘country dress’ (1.53) emblemizes that speech’s rugged Cynic strand.

²¹⁸ Cf. 1.50; 12.9, 85 (with Moles (1995b) 183); 33.14-15; 34.2; 70.8.

²¹⁹ Similarly, in the *Olympicus*, the visibly old, unkempt, ‘owlish’, suffering ‘Cynic’ Dio instantiates Greece herself: Moles (1995b) 183.

²²⁰ Similar ‘write-your-own-life’ challenges in the *First Kingship* (esp. 1.49); the *Fourth Kingship*; the *Euboicus*; the *Borystheniticus* and the *Charidemus*: Moles (1990) 335-6; 348-50; 372 n.119; (1995b) 178-9; 190-2; (2000a), esp. 194-9, 207-9.

Imaginatively conceived and perfectly realized in unfailingly creative Greek, *Or.* 13 offers many pleasures. It also makes demands, some of which may seem to be ‘purely literary’. But its final demands are moral and the literary demands are subservient to them. We should all appreciate the enormous resource and freshness with which Dio brings those demands to our attention. But perhaps even today a few may find that the ‘simple’ moral demands of ‘ancient Dio’ have not entirely lost their power.

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